Re:Balance -- Jim Peterson

“Managed Shared Audits” in the UK – The Largest “Challengers” Think Not

What – they expected gratitude?

“Managed shared audits” were at the center of the UK government’s March 18 Consultation paper on audit reform. The proposal, aimed to loosen the Big Four’s dominant hold on the audits of the FTSE 350, would specifically benefit the smaller, wretchedly-designated “challenger” firms, by mandatory carve-out of ten to thirty percent of each newly-tendered audit to be gifted to the latter.

For reasons outlined here on April 21, and detailed in my short book on the post-Carillion environment in the UK,[1] the imposition of shared audits across the FTSE 350, never realistic, was fatally flawed and doomed to rejection. Quickly summarized: for the companies themselves, the process would be unmanageable, while the Big Four would gain nothing but valueless inflation of their costs, effort and liability exposure, and the smaller firms could never provide the necessary skills, personnel and capability.

One deservedly skeptical response to this offer –- another version of “We’re from the government, and here to help you” -- is now essentially confirmed. Instead of thankful appreciation, the UK firms of BDO and Grant Thornton – ranked fifth and sixth in the league tables – have recognized and spurned the government’s poisoned chalice. Their “no thanks” -- reported in the Financial Times of May 25 –- was spun diplomatically, as their “considering not pitching for work on shared audits of FTSE 100 companies….”

Their demurrer echoes the mordant humor of Abraham Lincoln, who captured the pain and frustration of the American presidency by likening his position to the man tarred and feathered and carried out of town on a rail – who, asked how he liked it, replied that “if it were not for the honor of the thing, he would much rather walk.”

As put to the FT by Grant Thornton’s head of audit, “If the challenger firm is just going to get what’s left at the bottom of the barrel, that’s not interesting and doesn’t help….”

Although the FT coyly suggests that the two firms “are considering focusing on increasing the number of FTSE 250 companies they audit,” Grant Thornton’s shared audit stand-down aligns with the reasons that underlay its 2018 decision “to stop bidding for audit contracts from Britain’s largest companies after concluding it is too difficult to compete with the Big Four firms that dominate the market.”

Clear perspective on the scale necessary to perform large complex audits reveals these implications, too important to ignore:

• First are the size comparisons illustrated by the 2020 revenues of BDO and Grant Thornton (globally $ 10.3 billion and $ 5.76 billion) –- fractions of the Big Four which range from KPMG at $ 29 billion to Deloitte’s table-topping $ 47.6 billion. The inhibitions on the “challengers” are not (necessarily) those of performance quality. Rather, as one FT reader incisively commented, a house carpenter may be perfectly competent to build a single-family home, but could not possibly qualify to build a high-rise tower.

• Second, in the other direction, BDO and Grant Thornton –- as the largest among the smaller -- were noted by the FT to “earn more UK audit fees in aggregate than the next 14 challengers combined.” Not only should their strategically rational risk and capacity assessments compel a reality check for their brethren down the size chart. In addition, their opting out of a shared audit regime emphatically rebuts the possibility that the remaining firms, however willing, could make up a critical mass of delivery capacity.  

The Consultation’s move for “managed shared audit” took a deliberate pass on even less achievable proposals, to enforce Big Four caps or market share re-distribution of the FTSE 350 audit sector. Its single idea so discredited, whither now?[2]

Fundamental re-engineering of large-company information assurance, guided by the insights of Sir Donald Brydon in his December 2019 “Independent Review Into the Quality and Effectiveness of Audit,” requires attention to the dysfunctionalities embedded in the current model. Those include the archaic and outmoded constraints on the scope of permissible auditor services, and the potentially fatal litigation impact on the firms’ financial and business structures, awaiting with the inevitable financial failures on the magnitude of Enron that disintegrated Arthur Andersen in 2002.

Assurance sufficiently extensive and flexible to be fit for today’s demands will remain beyond reach, until and unless the public dialog embraces discussion of these issues. Otherwise, as BDO and Grant Thornton have now confirmed, the dominance of the Big Four as presently configured –- even inhibited as they are by the golden handcuffs of their franchise -- is the only game in town.    

 

[1] “DOA: Can Big Audit Survive the UK Regulators” (Amazon 2019)

[2] One of the aggressive voices for mandated sector re-structuring was that of the Competition & Markets Authority, then led by since-departed Sir Andrew Tyrie. Even with its bust-up advocacy, the CMA’s April 2019 “Statutory Audit Services Market Study” gave legitimacy to the strategic reluctance of Grant Thornton to pursue FTSE 350 audits, conceding (¶ 3.135) that it “may be a rational reaction….”  

 

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Re-Allocating the Big Audit Market in the United Kingdom – Or Perhaps Not

"Two aristocrats are out horseback riding and one challenges the other to see which can come up with the larger number. The second agrees to the contest, concentrates for a few minutes, and proudly announces, “Three.” The proposer of the game is quiet for half an hour, then finally shrugs and concedes defeat.”

     -- Mathematics professor John Allen Paulos, “Innumeracy” (Hill & Wang 1988)

Regulators and politicians in the United Kingdom may well disrupt the Big Audit model – judging from inquiries launched recently by the Financial Reporting Council and the Competition & Markets Authority. The series that began here on September 25 and October 8, started to address the misguided nature of the purported “remedies.” It is making for pretty heavy going – so with thanks for the opportunity to write this as guest for Going Concern, this to lighten things up a bit.

Grave as are the UK threats to break up the Big Four, strip them down to “audit only” or impose government appointment of large-company auditors, it would take a comedy script-writer to capture the folly by which, it is suggested, the Big Four would “voluntarily” reduce their dominant market share of the FTSE 350 from 97% to 80%.

The head of assurance for Grant Thornton in the UK offered on September 14 that a nationalized appointment authority, which “would take the buying decision from the company … could split audits, say 50 for the Big Four and 50 for the non-Big Four.”

Seriously intended or not, the idea comes oddly from those with expertise in the assessment and comprehension of quantitative information. What comes to mind instead is the stateroom scene in “Night at the Opera.”

To expand and explain -- by 2017 revenue, the ten large firms in the UK array as in the table below (in £ millions). Of their £ 13 billion total, the Big Four garnered over £ 11 billion or 86%. The trailing six firms divided the remaining 14%.  

PwC	3,598
Deloitte	3,380
EY	2,350
KPMG	2,172
Grant Thornton	500
BDO	429
RSM	320
Moore Stephens	181
Mazars	173
PKF	130

If the notion of shifting fully half of the FTSE 100 audits were apportioned by firm revenue, Grants would take fifteen, BDO twelve, RSM nine, and each of the others four or five.

Collectively, how ready and capable would they be? BDO presently has only one such engagement -- Randgold Resources Ltd – actually on the bubble at # 101 -- and that one is likely to go away with the September 25 announcement that the company is to be acquired by Barrick Gold Corp, an audit client of PwC in Toronto.

Grants itself once had a FTSE 100 client, until the stock price collapse of Sports Direct dropped its ranking to # 181. And in any event, that job is to move with the upcoming displacement of Grants thanks to the UK’s mandatory tender and replacement rules. None of the other mid-size firms audits a FTSE 100 company.

As graphically displayed here on September 25, the impact of scale is critical. No number of hours at the controls of a single-engine airplane can qualify a pilot, however skilled, to command a wide-body jet – much less a helicopter or a space shuttle or a stealth drone.

No less, and without a whisper as to the relative work quality up and down the table, the requirement of experience at the Big Four level in performing large-company audits with global footprints and necessary industry expertise is compelling.

So despite the reams of paperwork that will be generated through the inquiries of the UK regulators, it remains a solid certainty that nothing like the suggested 50/50 re-allocation of the FTSE 100 will ever happen.

Sooner the proponents, like Professor Paulos’s mounted aristocrat, eventually “shrug and concede defeat,” sooner the discussion can move to steps of possible achievability and beneficial effect.

 

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A New Entry in Charlie Munger’s Daily Journal

The usually sharp-tongued Francine McKenna was the very vision of under-statement in her Market Watch for March 3, describing the auditor merry-go-round at the Daily Journal Corporation (DJCO), the odd public company controlled by Charlie Munger – himself better known as the long-time advisor, consigliere and general-purpose wheelman to investor legend Warren Buffett.

In September 2014, Munger had loudly replaced EY with BDO, intolerant of successive annual auditor letters criticizing the internal controls and identifying potential weaknesses at the Daily Journal and snarling, about what he called an “audit from hell,” that EY had been “like the doctor who wanted to cure the nosebleed by fishing around in the groin.”

BDO promptly proved itself no more tractable, in Munger’s view – sacked on this February 17 after two years of “material weakness” letters, to be replaced considerably down the audit firm food chain by the Squar Milner firm.

Slightly re-wording Oscar Wilde’s Lady Bracknell:

“To lose one auditor may be regarded as a misfortune; to lose two looks like carelessness.”

Or something else. Twice within two years, it’s a double-barreled validation of the diminished role of independent auditors, at least as seen by Munger as board chairman and major shareholder.

That is, the language of the Daily Journal’s next auditor’s report will look precisely the same, whether signed by EY, BDO or Squar, wherever they may fall on the profession’s size tables.

Of the Squar Milner firm it expresses no disrespect to note that its handful of offices in southern California (plus an outpost in the Cayman Islands showing one resident), 19 audit partners and $ 55 million in annual revenue make it approximately 1/500^th the size of EY, third largest of the global Big Four and reporting 212,000 world-wide employees and $ 29 billion in 2015 revenue.

The lack of auditor value as perceived by a company chairman as confident and self-regarding as Munger should come as no surprise. The greater point is that the public holders of the 38% of the Daily Journal’s stock not in the hands of insiders also showed their complete indifference.

That is, the company’s stock price in the week of BDO’s firing and Squar’s arrival held rock steady at the news ($ 189 - $ 190, and since risen to $ 194) – just as it had done 18 months earlier (between $ 181 and $ 182) with the firing of EY.

Put somewhat differently, the entire episode makes plain again that the identity of the audit firm placing its name to the commodity language of the traditional “pass/fail” report as required by the SEC is a matter to which investors attribute no value at all.

Those continuing to extol the value of privately-provided assurance, at least in the form currently prescribed by the world’s securities regulators, are just as entitled to their views as is Munger.

As the evidence continues to mount, however, that their position is belied by the real behavior of the participants in the capital markets – Munger providing the latest example – a more valuable exercise would involve a fundamental re-examination of the premises underlying that self-serving proposition.  

 

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And please see here for access to and a synopsis of “Count Down: The Past, Present and Uncertain Future of the Big Four Accounting Firms”—my recently published book where these and other concerns for the large-company audit model are fully explored.  

Seidman Gets a New Trial in Bankest -- And How Does Winning Feel?

“Never mud-wrestle with a pig. You end up covered with pig-shit. And the pig actually likes it.”

There was palpable relief on June 23 in the halls of international accounting network BDO’s firm in the US, née Seidman. The Florida Court of Appeals, reversing a potentially devastating $521 million jury verdict, ordered a new trial of the claims by Banco Espirito Santo relating to alleged faulty audits of the irregular accounts of Seidman's factoring company client Bankest.

Updating earlier attention to this threat hanging over Seidman’s existence since 2007 (here, here and here), it is now right to look beyond the predictable chest-thumping press releases of the adversaries (see here), and contemplate just who has won what.

Notably, to start, Seidman lives to fight on.

Even though the opinion (available here) makes clear that the appellate court would not have let stand the $321 million in punitive damages imposed by the jury for its finding of Seidman’s egregious conduct, the Seidman firm was still facing disintegration. Being forced to pay only the $159 million of compensatory or “ordinary” damages would have inflicted on its 273 partners the unsustainable obligation to work for nothing for a year or more (based on industry profit margin data and Seidman’s reported fiscal 2009 revenue of $620 million - here). 

Dealing not with the merits, but only with the defects in procedure it found in the lower court’s trial management, the appellate tribunal held that the claims of Seidman’s grossly negligent conduct were inextricably “intertwined” with issues of “causation, reliance, and comparative fault” – that is, in lay terms, that Seidman’s allegedly bad behavior should have been evaluated by the jury in context of the bad behavior of all the other actors in the sordid story of Bankest.

So the press-release confidence of Seidman’s CEO, that it “acted at all times consistent with its professional obligations,” has been neither established nor vindicated, but remains to be re-tested in another fulsome public proceeding.

As for the Banco plaintiffs, the obligation to re-try the case is another reminder of the lawyers’ caution, to be careful of getting your wish from a trial judge. A lawyer who rings the bell for a huge jury verdict, when the judge has put the bell-rope in his hands, may walk with a little more clank in his swagger. But a judgment only really counts as bankable when affirmed on appeal and collected.  

And while both sides will claim to have learned of their courtroom strengths and weaknesses from the original trial, the very rationale of the appellate rulings that require a new trial also gives a road-map for the other side by which to by-pass the perceived speed-bumps the first time.

So with the learning process a bi-lateral one, another go-round will feature re-treaded strategies on both sides.

Which reinforces the attitude of courtroom veterans, that second trials have the inevitably stale air of re-cycled themes, witnesses and evidence – the very reason they happen so seldom.

That sentiment plus traditional analysis suggest that, under the appellate court’s signals about the extent of the penalty against Seidman that it would sustain, the parties will reach a settlement – one that to Seidman would be highly painful but tolerable – in effect, the number of months its partners might stand to work without take-home pay before they bolt for the exits.

On the other hand, trials of life-threatening claims against the large accounting firms are so rare as to make impossible either patterns or reliable predictions.

The Florida court did make one observation of unintended and presumably un-ironic import:

“An accounting firm that must distribute its net income and net worth to judgment creditors rather than the partners who produced that income will not have partners (or clients) for long.”

In other words, even a small state’s intermediate judiciary recognizes that so long as the large accounting networks are put to the hazard of litigating for their survival, the entire global franchise of privately-provided assurance is at risk.   

Critics of that structure, who in essence dispute the very legitimacy of the firms’ business models (here), remain challenged to articulate an achievable alternative that will offer sustainable value to the community of financial statement users.

If the prolonged and now-extended agony of Bankest teaches nothing else, it is that the auditor-viability dialog is still not satisfactorily engaged.

 

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Summertime, And The Living Is Easy -- At Least For Now

      “If you’ve nothing nice to say…. come sit by me.”

 -- Dorothy Parker

With the change of seasons, I am just back from a two-week break in Russia, including a stretch so deep in the countryside as to be beyond all connectivity.

An annual break is probably no less important in the ink-spreading trades than elsewhere – although more for health and re-focus than for risk control (witness the “vacation rule” violations now part of the Paris trial of Société Générale’s rogue trader Jérôme Kerviel).

In any event it’s a good time for a pause:

• BP’s agonies in the Gulf and in Washington have pushed off the front pages the mis-adventures of Goldman Sachs and Lehman Brothers, showing once again that the capacity for public outrage is both finite and subject to “proximity bias.”

• The late-stage negotiations in the US Congress over financial institutions reform legislation include not one word of attention to the survivability plight of the global audit franchise of the Big Four firms – leaving that multi-dimensional problem to leap onto the public screen with the next (and inevitable) outbreak of financial scandal.
  

• Two significant court decisions still await the leisurely pace of the judiciary: the Florida appellate ruling in the Bankest matter, which could determine the fate of the Seidman accounting firm, and the United States Supreme Court’s now overdue ruling on the constitutionality of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (see here) – the latter having potential to unleash onto the world of financial information regulation all the mischief that Messrs. Frank, Waxman and Dodd can muster.

• And above all, outside the US at least, the season of the Coupe du Monde attracts far more interest and attention -- especially with the French team crashed out early in a spasm of mediocrity, petulance and politics -- than the soporific pronouncements from the accounting standards-setters about GAAP/IFRS convergence.

There being nothing worth tooting a vuvuzela about, in other words, let respect be paid to the quiet of summer.

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Market Concentration of the Big Four Audit Firms: The Feasibility of a Suggested Trade -- Divestiture for Liability Limitations

“No such thing as a failed experiment …. only experiments with unexpected outcomes.”-- American engineer-architect R. Buckminster Fuller

 Is the Big Four’s concentrated control of large company audits a real problem? Persistent voices of concern and attention extend back at least to the 2006 study for the Financial Reporting Counsel (here), recently joined by global leadership of BDO and Grants (here and here).

If so, is there a credible case to incentivize their exchange of market dominance for liability limitations?

Those issues were addressed this month in a paper from the American Antitrust Institute – here. In an all-too-rare burst of clarity, the AAI forthrightly recognizes that:

With pending claims totaling billions of dollars, the Big 4 audit firms face serious threats to their survival…. (L)iability exposure substantially exceeds the combined partner capital of the Big 4 firms… (They) contend that liability limits are necessary to prevent the loss of another Big 4 firm, which would throw the global financial system into chaos. (footnotes omitted)   

The AAI’s suggestion would be a legislated trade-off: “government incentives to break up the Big 4 into smaller, more competitive firms” – namely, a liability cap conditioned on a firm divesting itself of, say, 20% of its domestic revenue and the personnel serving the surrendered clients.

Can’t work – because of the many problems with the underlying but unachievable assumptions. 

But before getting there -- the AAI deserves credit at least for recognizing the completeness of the Big Four’s market dominance – auditing “nearly all of the world’s public companies with annual sales over $250 million” (emphasis in original) – with even tighter limitations on auditor choice in such industries as metals and mining, energy, air transportation and financial services.

Start with the political unacceptability of liability capping at a level that can assure Big Four survival. I have spelled out before (here) the financial limits of the large firms’ private partnership structure and their membrane-thin working capital, under which they cannot withstand litigation shocks above the $1 - $2 billion range – a tiny fraction (by either amount or percentage) of the exposures in their pending lawsuit inventory.

As the AAI paper summarizes, critics of liability protection point to the firms’ average litigation payouts, as a percentage of revenues and as compared to the far larger total of alleged damages. They fail to recognize – as do the arguments for capping from the profession itself -- that averages are meaningless when the “outlier” of a single verdict, falling outside the misleading comfort zone of a bell-curve model, could and would be devastating.   

So: because American politics offers no cover for protection at those levels, that side of the proposed AAI bargain is no solution. What of the other side -- the plausibility of large-scale competitors emerging from the suggested divestiture program? The facts dictate otherwise.

First, an abundance of small practices already exist. Why they have not coalesced into global-scale practices is a long-familiar story of limited geographic scope, expertise, risk appetite and readiness to invest.

Second, the smaller sector does not inspire confidence in its strength or capacity for quality growth to global scale. Of the largest, BDO’s Seidman firm in the US is on a deathwatch, facing the post-appeal enforceability of its $521 million jury verdict in Miami. Grant Thornton – not yet fully disengaged from the Refco matter in which lawyer Joe Collins just received a seven-year prison sentence – now faces the fall-out of being fired by Koss, its public but family-dominated Milwaukee client, whose CFO managed for years to steal amounts in excess of the company’s total net revenue (on which, to read Francine McKenna in unusually high dudgeon, see Re:The Auditors.)

Third, as a practical matter, how would global-scale competition emerge? If a Big Four firm were to hive off a small geography-based practice, that newcomer would suffer handicaps of capacity and expertise no different that those of the current smaller firms.  If a large firm were to shed an entire industry practice, no new competition is added to serve that industry. And if instead, it were to divide a viable large-scale practice, then each of the two sub-practices would be burdened with shortages of expertise, personnel and the capital strength necessary to build to scale and withstand their risks.

In summary, the AAI’s aspirations fall victim yet again to the Nirvana Fallacy – the defect in logic I described (here) in the comparison of a failing situation against an idealized state, without recognizing that the assumed achievement is impossible under real-world limits, flaws and constraints.

The large firms grew that way for service-based reasons. And dreams of expanding the population of pygmies do not, sadly, increase the likelihood of evolving a giant.

At bottom, the AAI’s most seriously under-examined assumption is that the “catastrophic” disintegration of another Big Four firm “would throw the global financial system into chaos.”

Why so? To the contrary, if the now-standard auditors’ report were suddenly not to be obtainable from any source, who would miss it?

Regulators and politicians would have convulsions, to be sure. But as the financial crisis itself has shown, that is daily practice for office-holders in the hermetic confines of Washington and London and Brussels.  

Should the stock exchanges be closed, if a Big Four failure meant that one-quarter of the large listed companies lacked an audit report? Could those companies’ securities be barred from trading? Unthinkable. Out where capital really flows and trade is actually engaged, the world’s markets would shrug, start the process of designing new forms of assurance from a blank page, and move on.

And the splintered pieces of the former Big Four would provide ample building blocks for a new assurance structure – without, pace the AAI, any need or use for the unintended and unpredictable hazards of another failed experiment.

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Previewing 2010 -- And a Note of Thanks

As the old year winds down to the winter solstice and all those rituals by which we mark the holiday season, a brief look ahead.

Depending on reckoning, the New Year will either end an old decade or begin the next one. Whichever, here are a few events that will feature in 2010 among the on-going challenges to the global structure of large-company assurance:

• The Supreme Court in the US may well declare the PCAOB to have been illegally constituted (here or here). If so, predictable spasms of re-enactment and ratification by the SEC cannot successfully encompass such issues as the viability of pending investigations, the legitimacy of past inspection reports, or the need to re-register all the foreign accounting firms.

In the context of those issues of contention, the legislative mischief to be wrought by a Congress offered a blank page on which to re-debate the Sarbanes/Oxley law can scarcely be imagined.

• The fits and starts of accounting standards convergence will have no more traction than a pig on roller skates. The announced retirement of Sir David Tweedie as head of the IASB (here) will take one prickly personality off-stage, but will not solve the antagonisms among competing country and industry level interests. And as the scope of complexity and judgments within both GAAP and IFRS figure to be as significant as those between reporting systems, the achievability of comparability and comprehension will remain as elusive as ever. 

• Attempts to impose liability on the large accounting firms’ international structures will continue apace. The success of BDO International in confining the Bankest verdict in Miami to the Seidman firm alone (here) means that if that $521 million exposure becomes enforceable, BDO may need to find a new US member firm – a tactic painful enough for that organization but which none of the Big Four could achieve under like conditions.

Flashpoints for structural threats will include the Madoff-related feeder funds litigations, concentrated in the US but also spread around the world, and PwC’s exposure on Satyam.  And with PwC’s Indian partners on Satyam about to observe their first full year of local imprisonment, that network's attempts to extract itself from class action exposure in the American court system (here) raise the interesting question whether submission to Indian justice is really a preferred strategy.

• Tempting as it might be to be lured into the speculation about identifying which of the Big Four firm is most likely to disintegrate under the combined pressures of litigation and government threat, in 2010 or otherwise (here), I will decline – since the determining factor is the unpredictable timing of the cases themselves. Specify the judges’ scheduled trial dates for the 25 biggest cases hanging in Damoclean fashion over the large firms – and only then would I be able to offer a view.

• More broadly, strategic decision makers in the world of financial information will continue to confront the volatility of government conduct – an under-recognized factor in their overall risk assessment methodologies.
  

The reactive nature of public officials has been marked in recent years by an ad hoc cascade of unpredictable and unintended consequences – ranging in scope and scale from the back-of-envelope bank bail-out schemes to the bonus supertax in the United Kingdom to the first-ever invention in Dubai of a default-driven debt reorganization scheme of uncertain application or reliability.

So life in the forthcoming year will not be boring. 

Meanwhile, in this space, Re:Balance observes its second birthday. Launched in January 2008, this venture was the evolution from “Balance Sheet,” the column I had the six-year privilege and good fortune to write for the International Herald Tribune.

The challenges have been fascinating, starting with the anxiety-inducing migration from old-style print. No less than the accounting firms, the IHT itself -- like the other newspapers -- pursues its fading struggle in search of a sustainable niche business model. While in the world of rapidly mutating media platforms, the near-term impact of the likes of Twitter, Facebook and Kindle will continue at a dizzying pace to re-define the information landscape.  

It has been most gratifying over these two years, both to participate in community with an expanding group of smart and incisive commentators, and to experience steady growth in readership and especially in subscribers.

For these opportunities, I thank you all for your interest, your insights and your inputs.

Merry Christmas -- best holiday wishes -- and a healthy, peaceful and prosperous New Year to all. 

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A Summer Lull for the Accountants? Sez Who?

We ought by rights to be in the summer doldrums – those still doing real jobs are taking a break in the country or at the beach, and the rest are hunkered down till the headhunters come back to town in the fall. But there’s a sudden flurry of attention and activity around the world of the large accounting firms.

And while human societies are good at generating coincidental events that don’t really add up to a pattern, a little reflection indicates some possible common threads:

Item: Joining the expanding list of observers giving scrutiny to the business models and exposures of the large audit firms, comes the launch of Breaking Media’s new blog, “Going Concern” – dedicated, says its introduction, to “making accounting sexy.”

Well, maybe. Many of the large firms’ wounds are indeed self-inflicted. Still, snarky tabloid gossip that trades on the displays of venality and shortness of leadership vision will not advance the search for solutions to the profession’s lessening relevance and doubtful survivability. The issues are too nuanced and multi-faceted for that.      

But if it is facile to deliver easy jabs, even the kings of lore and legend engaged their court fools, so that hard truths could be wrapped in the wisdom of a laugh or two.

So welcome to Caleb Newquist’s new effort. Godspeed, and let the dialog expand. 

Item: The incongruous conjoining of “sexy” and “auditor” in the same sentence does seem like an effort for the scriptwriters of Monty Python -- proved again by the publicity last week around the presentation by Audit Analytics, “Accounting Professional Liability: Scorecards and Commentary.”

Variously describing the large firms’ litigation exposures as “a serious and growing problem,” or more gravely as “a breathtaking number,” the data for the Big Four firms should be a splash of cold water to awaken on the gravity of their exposure threat -- but in fact have yet to reach the level of public consciousness sufficient to kick-start a serious debate on the threatened viability of the large firms’ basic assurance franchise.   

Not that life is any more pleasant beneath the Big Four level:

Item: Up in the normally understated Scandinavian territory of Minneapolis, the McGladrey Pullen firm’s attempt to extricate itself from its entangled business venture with H&R Block and the RSM network was promptly met with a retaliatory lawsuit (here).

Among the more subtle lessons learnable from the break-up of the Andersen organization and the departure of its consulting practice to become Accenture was the potential for the distraction of management time, focus and strategy.

In that case the cleavage between practices made for at least reasonable clarity in the allocation of personnel, systems, methodology and real estate. Whereas in the McGladrey/RSM context, by contrast, reverse-engineering their constituent practices into separate and discrete post-divorce portions will be a little like manufacturing tomato juice by starting with V-8.    

Item: On the BDO front, where the Seidman firm in the United States faces the survival challenge of the adverse jury verdict of $521 million in the Bankest matter in Miami (here), the network’s UK form, Stoy Hayward, announced last week its process for making redundant a full 10% of its partners (here).

Even in good times the strategy is fraught with peril of “shrinking to success.” And here, a decimation of the crowd whistling past the litigation graveyard might be thought to leave the survivors even a little more lonely and anxious. Although BDO’s international firm has been relieved of legal exposure to the Bankest verdict, it is hard to see how an organization in down-sizing mode is thereby made more robust against the business challenge of a devastating financial shock to its US firm.

Item: And back at the biggest firms, the announcements of shortened work weeks, employee furloughs and deferred job offers continue apace – hardly the brightest news for anyone concerned for the gold content of the litigation eggs sought for gathering by investor plaintiffs from the Big Four geese.

Much ink is being spilled in the search for trends and indicators in the profession’s lawsuit case count – noted above – but the exercise in fruitless and misleading. The profession itself has consistently mis-analyzed its fundamental risks, by taking the approach of “we dodged that bullet, and we still do lots of good work.”

The inductive flaw is basic: it’s not the average settlement amounts or the successful engagements that are deadly, or the close calls that are survived. So long as worst-case auditor exposures are measured in the billions of dollars, by legal and regulatory systems that pit unachievable standards against the firms’ inevitable lapses in performance quality, the Big Four and their smaller brethren as well will be hostage to the one last explosion that will start the final destructive chain reaction.

So let the media commentaries roll on. But let at least some of it treat serious issues with the gravity deserved. 

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BDO's Liability for the Bankest Verdict Against Seidman: Whose Side to Take?

Ham-and-eggs for breakfast? To the hen, the choice is a matter of interest. To the pig, it’s life or death.

On the complexities of auditor liability and accounting firm survival, a reader last week had a subtle question. It concerned the Miami state court outcome in the Bankest litigation – where the BDO international firm was held not liable for any part of the $521 million jury verdict imposed in June 2007 against its US component, the Seidman accounting firm.

For the American partners of Seidman, the dispute now moves to its penultimate phases of appeal and possible enforcement of ruinous damages -- $170 million plus an additional punitive assessment of $351 million -- with this question:

As interested spectators of the trial just ended, which sought to hold BDO liable along with the Seidman firm, which side would they have been rooting for?

That is, facing financial devastation (for the calculations, see the Note below) – would they have preferred that their international brethren be put under judicial fiat to share their pain? Or are they better off standing alone – facing ruin, and hoping to rely on the strength of their network and the readiness of their colleagues to provide succor on the basis only of network agreements and business solidarity?

And in the end, will it matter? 

Those whose work is with the assessment and management of disputes look with envy on their counterparts who deal with allocating good and positive economic outcomes. Business lawyers, for example, thrive on the deals and contracts that include mutually shared profits, repeat business with counter-parties and the nurturing of on-going relationships.

The supporting literature of game theory and decision strategy offers exquisite exercises in dividing the results of negotiations -- heavily biased toward optimistic scenarios. Case studies on shared outcomes focus on happy conditions: the division between two strangers who find a wallet full of money, or how and whether to share the pay-off of a winning lottery ticket received as a gift.

The outcomes under dispute scenarios go the other way: typically they are zero-sum between one-time antagonists; lawsuits involve wasting assets and the steady bleeding of costs, legal fees and business pressures.

And the impositions of shared punishments or detriments are not the subject of useful scrutiny: litigation lawyers suffer the scholars who default to the platitudes of “re-framing for a ‘win-win’,” or “finding a way to ‘yes’.”

The real world doesn’t work that way. In the Bankest case, the impending next steps include the plaintiff’s pursuit of finality and collection of a half-billion dollars, the challenged viability of BDO as an international enterprise and the careers of its several thousand professionals, and – considering that Bankest is only a smaller version of the much bigger cases hanging over the Big Four – a clarion warning on the survivability of privately provided, large-company audit services.

Either way – whether BDO was formally held liable or not -- the final chapter for Seidman and BDO is ominous. The collapse of the Andersen network in 2002, within weeks of the indictment of its US firm – through the flight of clients, partners, personnel and the international entities – showed the fragility of the wealthiest and most cohesive of the large accounting structures.

Just as Andersen’s ex-US practices voted their local interests with their feet, it remains to be seen how the business and integrity of the BDO network could withstand the drain needed to sustain its vital US member firm.

And whether a Miami court judgment might affect BDO’s strategic choice between its own disintegration and collapse, and massive sacrifice for the sake of its US member firm, will be a matter not of legal enforceability but of corporate behavioral psychology at the highest level.

The graduate students in my MBA class on risk management and decision-making are always in need of good assignments. As the Seidman/BDO dynamic plays along, it will provide a rich if depressing study.

Please let me know – for whom would you have cheered, and why?  

Note: A model to calculate how big a “litigation hit” would disintegrate a large accounting firm was done by a UK consultancy for EU Markets Commissioner Charlie McCreevy – here. I have applied it to the Big Four’s American and global practices – here and here. The topic is anathema to the large firms, but they have not voiced public disagreement with either the approach or the frighteningly small numbers.

Based on Seidman’s reported 2008 revenue of $ 659 million and the BDO networks’ global figure of $ 5,145 million, the model indicates breakup thresholds of around $ 100 million for the US firm of Seidman on its own, and perhaps $ 750 million for the BDO network as a whole. Look on the Bankest verdict at $521 million – and despair.

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