Re:Balance -- Jim Peterson

The Accountants Are Toasting ESG -- With Loving Cup or Poisoned Chalice?

The accounting profession is joining in the broad-based enthusiasm for a future of greatly expanded attention to corporate reporting in the areas of Environmental, Social and Governance / Diversity, Equity and Inclusion. Whether the stampede is toward a new promised land of useful information, or a cliff-edge of hazard -- that remains to be seen.

My own recent contribution appears in this winter's special edition of the International Journal of Auditing (V.26, Issue 1), published by Wiley in the United Kingdom at the initiative of Dr. Ilias Basioutes, senior lecturer in Accounting at the Aston Business School in Birmingham, as an extension of the annual Audit & Assurance Conference under the auspices of the school and the Audit Group of the British Accounting Association.  With his kind permission it appears here:

THE FUTURE OF EXTERNAL AUDIT: ISSUES AND QUESTIONS 

Introduction

Prediction is very difficult, especially if it's about the future!

- Attributed most reliably to Danish physicist Niels Bohr

What does the future hold for ‘Big Audit’—the function that emerged in the Victorian era 1 to offer third-party assurance on company-provided information, valued and used by the world's capital markets?

Audits of public company financial statements, leading to the all-too-familiar ”true and fair view” opinion, are at the core of a formidable professional services franchise.2

Pressures on the model are multidimensional:

• The traditional ‘pass/fail’ opinion is criticized as simplistically inadequate to address the complexities of modern business reporting.
• The firms are stressed to embrace rapid developments in technology, big data and artificial intelligence and to cope with staffing and employee issues under the COVID-19 pandemic and the work/life concerns of younger generations of their workforce.
• Despite decades of attention to audit quality, costly corporate collapse and white-collar malfeasance persist—in recent years spanning from Carillion in the UK to WireCard in Germany. Highly publicized scandals generate both the expected question, “Where were the auditors?” and litigation at levels posing existential threat to the firms' survival.3

Little should be expected from the politicians and regulators. The consultation initiated by the UK government in March 2021, “Restoring Trust in Audit and Corporate Governance,” portends extended attention to the mission, scope and structure of a reconstructed UK audit regulator but is essentially silent on changes to the basic model of the firms themselves.

Driving real change, however, will be the loud and demanding calls for expanded corporate transparency in a multitude of areas— loosely gathered as Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) and lately extended to the rubrics of Diversity, Equity and Inclusion (DEI).

Under the imperatives and opportunities of the capital markets, new corporate disclosures may be supported by third-party assurance from sources still to be determined. In that new landscape, where would the accountants find themselves? What might or could they do? Prudently considered, what should they do?

The Accountants Should Be There

The accounting profession has a prima facie claim for a seat at the table. Evidence that assurance providers were “counting the stuff’ goes back to the Sumerian era, when clay tablets were inscribed to record quantities of grain and livestock. At the meta-level, the auditors have provided assurance process innovation and application for 170 years.4 Whether that history supports a claim for primacy may be another matter.

Along with the accounting firms themselves, bodies including the International Federation of Accountants, the ICAEW in the United Kingdom and the Center for Audit Quality in the United States are tub-thumping advocates of a presumptively leading role for the profession.

Observers such as Sir Donald Brydon are more measured. His report of December 2019 on his “Independent Review into the Quality and Effectiveness of Audit” expresses the desirability of a new professional designation—the corporate auditor—contemplating a remit well beyond that of statutory auditors, “to encompass today's auditors and others with appropriate education and authorization” (¶ 6.0.11).

The Brydon report's salient observations suggest that the range of subject matter expertise and competencies required to put flesh on the auditors' process skeleton may be more extensive than is presently available or as envisioned in the self-regarding eyes of the profession itself (all emphasis added):

“... It is far from clear that an accountant is best placed to opine on many of the variables involved (¶ 6.0.13).

“Whilst in this new environment there may be environmental auditors, cyber security auditors and financial statement auditors, only some would need to have an accountancy qualification as known today” (¶ 6.0.14).

Some Threshold Questions

There are threshold questions in the ESG/DEI discussion, answers to which are still on the far horizon. They start with the challenge of articulating the “standards” against which companies will report and under which auditors may provide some form of assurance.

Simply, what is a “standard,” and how is it to be interpreted, applied and enforced?

Ad hoc communities of the great and the good are vying among themselves to proclaim both virtue and competence in standards setting. Self-designation carries no real weight, however; history teaches that stature and credibility are only achieved, and legitimacy bestowed and maintained, through public acceptance, when and if value is demonstrated and responsibility is accepted and enforced.

There is some inchoate understanding, visible among the players, of the uncertainties involved:

• The merger of the International Integrated Reporting Council and the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board into a newly launched Value Reporting Foundation reflected the reality that streamlining and convergence are essential.
• On 3 November 2021, the IFRS Foundation Trustees announced the long-awaited and much-promoted launch of the new International Sustainability Standards Board, one approach to the ultimate need for broadly endorsed official standards recognition and sanction.

Complete global convergence is unlikely, however, as already signaled by separate efforts of the SEC in the United States on climate disclosure and unilateral movement in the European Union toward mandated assurance.5

The Overhanging Issues of Liability 

The skunk at this otherwise optimistic and congenial garden party is that of legal liability. While the prospect of major exposures looms on the horizon, there is no likelihood of short or medium term change in the liability exposure for auditors offering ESG/DEI assurance:

• Barring the unlikely adoption of “safe harbour” protection for assurance in whatever form, inevitable lawsuits will assert liability based on the broad association of the provider's name and brand, whatever the ostensible limitations of its report language. Under the particular conditions of each individual case, it will be asserted that the “standards” were unsatisfactory or deficient to protect the interests of users, or that if the standards had only been properly understood and applied, an allegedly deficient report would and should not have been issued.
• Engagement contract provisions between auditors and clients, to cap or otherwise mitigate potential exposures, have failed to attract widespread or indeed any significant adoption. Public companies in the United States are prohibited by the SEC from using such provisions in any event. Future adoption cannot be anticipated.
• There is no public appetite to relieve the auditors of their generally unlimited liability to investors and others; no realistic expectation exists of liability “reform,” caps on damages or other relief.

Some Nightmare Examples

When an assurance engagement thought to be low risk does go wrong, as some number surely will, the consequences can be wildly disproportionate to a firm's approach to its risk assessment or to the quality of resources and performance actually delivered.

It requires little enough to hypothesize a menu of situations that would spawn serious litigation against ESG/DEI assurance providers, whoever they may be—auditors or others:

• Hard on the heels of an opinion on the controls and governance of a dealer in precious metals, a whistle-blower reveals the entity to be engaged in systematic gold smuggling and money laundering.
• Within a year of an environmental safety report, offering assurance on a global energy company's procedures for controlling the completion of its offshore oil wells, a new blowout occurs on the scale of the 2010 Deepwater Horizon. Weeks are needed to bring it under control; it causes unquantifiable ocean pollution and damages in the billions to regional businesses, fisheries and wildlife, resorts and tourism.
• Directly after a “reasonableness” opinion on a global clothing manufacturer's disclosures of the structural safety of its factories, a high-rise sweatshop in a developing country collapses. Building and contents are a total loss, along with extensive fatalities among the trapped workers.
• An assurance report is delivered on a company's compliance with its country's standards for the number of vehicles necessary for timely evacuation of a factory's workers in an emergency. Unfortunately, a massive accident destroys the facility, with an 80% fatality rate among the workers. Subsequent investigation reveals that while the number of vehicles on site was in compliance with the minimum set by the standards, one third were inoperable and awaiting maintenance; in any event, even the total number could at most have accommodated no more than half the number of workers on site at the time of the evacuation order.

The Profession’s Own Perspective

Optimism and “success bias” are deeply embedded in the DNA of the accounting profession. Well they should be, to meet the complex needs involved in building and leading large organizations in fast- evolving conditions.

But—a personal perspective—in dealing for nearly 50 years with the threats against auditors in their most difficult and dangerous situations, I have long seen their continuing desire to focus on “all the things we do right, that we never get credit for.”

That is especially true for assurance other than statutory audit— whether compilation or reviews, agreed-upon procedures or opinions worded in “limited” or “reasonableness” language. For these, the default attitude is “they're low risk, and people have to understand our role.”

Both of which are true, most of the time. But not always. To invoke the maxim for the occasional discipline of unruly small children, “When I do good, nobody remembers; when I do bad, nobody forgets.”

As For Possible Future Directions?

So what might the future hold? Assuming medium-term formalization of standards and reporting for ESG/DEI, either voluntarily or by official mandate, and the publication of a critical mass of assurance reports, there will follow a small but non-zero number of corporate breakdowns that involve and implicate the performance of the providers.

Some number of accountants and other assurance providers, convinced to accept engagements to provide “limited” or “reasonableness” opinions, will find their work challenged in the courts. Defenses against asserted damages at potentially catastrophic levels will be required. Litigation outcomes being unpredictable, at minimum those firms will incur and expend extensive time, expense and settlement costs.

Other providers, in their exercise of risk assessment, will have foregone the acceptance of ESG/DEI assurance engagements, unless protected from exposure to potentially ruinous liability. It may be expected that such decisions will predominate both in the US and for ex-US companies whose US-traded securities open the door to litigation under that country's legal system.

There is a third scenario for the accountants, if allowed to chart their own course over an uncertain ESG/DEI landscape that lacks dependable signage and is fraught with hazards. By analogy to the tax consulting services that the firms have delivered for decades, they would have a consultative role, both valuable and manageable, bringing expertise and discipline in support of their clients' disclosures, while refraining from extending their own opinions where the value is uncertain and the risks are increased, unpredictable and beyond quantification.

Two factors could complicate such a strategy. The first is that zealous regulators could attempt to mandate ESG/DEI assurance, despite or without adequate assessment of the limitations and complexities.6

Second, the scope of technical competencies and expertise required to support broadened ESG/DEI reporting and assurance has potential to clash with the rules of independence and permissible scope of services that constrain the accountants, particularly in tension with their statutory audits.

That is, because ESG/DEI assurance is likely to be viewed by regulators as insufficiently related to statutory audit to be a permissible service to those clients, firms could be deterred from investing to build that practice in the first place. Further, attempts to house these ancillary non-audit resources inefficiently in separate parts of their organizational structures may not satisfy narrowly read prohibitions. At worst, the competitive tensions between separate practices could renew and exacerbate the dynamics that led to the divorce between audit and consulting that split up the Arthur Andersen organization in the late 1990s.

Conclusion

It should surprise nobody that the concerns in this rapidly evolving area are real and complex. Absent full and robust attention, constructively addressed at an early stage, adverse consequences can be expected; because they are identifiable now, they will not in the future honestly qualify as “unintended.”

 

1 Research in the archives of the British National Library for my book,  Count Down: The Past, Present and Uncertain Future of the Big Four Accounting Firms (Emerald Books 2d ed 2017), pages 28–34, shows what may be the first modern independent auditor's opinion, dated and signed by William Welch Deloitte on 8 February 1850, on the financial statements of the Great Western Railway for the half-year ended 31 December 1849.

2 Together, the dominant Big Four international networks—Deloitte, EY, KPMG and PwC—have over 1.1 million employees and generated 2020 global revenue of $157 billion.

3 For calculations of the shockingly low litigation “tipping points” that would drive a Big Four firm into the death spiral that was fatal to Arthur Andersen in 2002—never publicly disputed or contradicted—see pages 56–64 of Count Down.

4 This was Mr. Deloitte's description of his scope for Great Western in 1850 (see Count Down page 31):

“Every item has been minutely examined by the Auditors, the vouchers and receipts have been inspected, and the purpose to which the payments were applied has been ascertained. “

5 A close-by context confirms that view, by analogy: The widespread adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards for financial statement reporting has not overcome some local authorities' retention of their own reporting frameworks.

Broader still, as if confirmation were needed that there will be no arrival at a Nirvana of fully converged ESG/DEI standards, consider the impact on the global economies of the costs and inefficiencies of such competing national choices as between left versus right-hand driving, or the use of imperial versus metric measures of weights, volumes and distances.

6 If so, it would not be the first instance of such overreach. The consequences are still developing on the EC's misguided imposition of mandatory auditor rotation. Meanwhile, in the United Kingdom, only an outbreak of good sense stands in the way of the government's consultation proposal for “mandated shared audits” for FTSE 350 companies.

 

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Big Audit Leaves Russia – Or Does It?

Rapidly as world events are moving, it’s my pleasure to share my guest post of today on The Dig, my friend Francine McKenna’s always sharp-pointed substack, with her incisive sub-head:

“Ties were severed with an ease and speed that suggest the auditor global networks may be more fragile than advertised.”

"We should go" -- Chris Woolf (Ben Affleck), The Accountant (2016).

We’ll only know with the judgment of history whether the large global accounting networks’ readiness to separate from their member firms in Russia had any impact whatsoever on the political and economic outcome of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. For now, as Churchill described the actions of Russia in 1939, “it is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.”

Two-plus weeks into the increasingly bloody morass of Vladimir Putin’s “special military operation,” however, there can be these observations:

• The largest six networks (as of this writing) have acted to join an ever-expanding list of firms and companies, public and private, choosing the right side of history by withdrawing from Russia.

• Which said, the accounting networks’ structures and the nature of the Big Audit model –- both differing fundamentally from those of the world’s largest corporations and the lawyers, consultants and other professional service providers – mean that in actual practice the impact is likely to be minimal.

• Once beyond the immediate optics and a modest amount of house-keeping, the ease and speed with which these amputations were carried out suggest that future distress scenarios should be seen as dire.[1]  

Grant Thornton led on March 1, and then the terminations came raining down –- PwC and KPMG, EY, Deloitte as the last of the Big Four, and BDO on March 9. The pack of red cards lagged business cessation announcements by McKinsey, Apple, Nike, and a partial but growing list of the large law firms, although ahead of giants in the consumer sector — McDonalds, Coca-Cola and Starbucks — and lately even bankers Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan Chase.

Their public face was one of collegial amiability; if couched as divorces, they would anticipate future reconciliation or re-engagement. EY’s press release offered comfort that the “EY global organization assured that it would provide assistance to Russian employees.” PwC Russia put it that, “This transition is expected to be smooth and the PwC Global leadership team has stressed that it would make every effort to support our Russian colleagues and firm through the process.”  

Looking ahead, the tone of the announcements fairly brimmed with confidence:

• PwC stated that, “The principles and rules of working with clients in Russia will remain unchanged.”

• Over at EY, “EY Russian practice is providing and will continue to provide services to all its clients in accordance with high quality standards based on international methodologies developed by the global organization, which will continue to provide methodological support to Russian practice.” 

The basic organization of the large networks portended the up-beat tone. As well enough known but seldom scrutinized, they are assemblages of distinct and separate legal entities, organized and providing client services at the local country level to comply with the local nature of the profession’s regulation. They are, for the most part, various types of private partnerships, owned by their local partners who share profits and losses at that level. They do not have outside third-party capital, a corporate “parent,” or a top-level “holding company,” although most have some form of non-practicing administrative entity that is inserted into a complex web of inter-firm contractual agreements to facilitate the handling of intellectual property, methodology sharing, quality oversight, personnel transfers and the like.

Very little need change to maintain the status quo. Daily life at both the newly-outcast Russian firms and their quondam colleagues ex-Russia will evolve in ways that are both marginal and limited. That’s especially as compared to the disruption being caused by outside forces, as the array of Western sanctions on companies and individuals both Russia-based and doing business there looks expansive, targeted, and significant.

Those effects, however, would befall the accounting networks and firms whether the Russian members were in or out.

• Employees of the newly-isolated Russian firms will continue to work the same jobs, at the same locations and under the same leaders as before.

• The fortunes of the Russian partners will continue to depend on their on-going local practices –- although as noted, impacted by Western sanctions –- but not radically different from under the large networks’ localized compensation ethos of “eat-what-you-kill.”

• Change management will be trivial. Clients and other interested parties will have received the news of the Russian firms’ status almost instantaneously. With marginal effect in the marketplace, the firms’ publicity resources will be occupied briefly with revised branding announcements, re-labelled publications, website re-designs and the issuance of new business cards.

Nor is there any reason to doubt the limited nature and scope of the impact on the execution of Big Audit engagements. For these, there are two aspects:

• An audit firm in Russia, engaged by a client based there and having international operations, would always have relied on its collegial network member firms to perform any necessary non-Russia work. That need will continue, although under the global-level assurances of on-going cross-border amity, it will be uninhibited by the cosmetics of separation (while, as noted, very possibly affected by the sanctions regimes).

• Symmetrically, the auditor of a non-Russia company with operations in Russia will have relied traditionally on its member firm there to audit and report on the local results. Again, going forward (and noting that the audits of companies exiting or halting their Russian business may now have to address the accounting for operating losses or discontinued operations), the local Russian firm would presumably be available to be engaged at arm’s-length — deploying its personnel and relying on the non-Russia referring firm to provide technical consultation and methodology guidance, just as a large network has always done to secure services in a country where it might not have its own network member. 

So far, very likely all well and good, if lacking in drama — save for this: when the violence has ended, and the dust of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict has settled, both literal and figurative, a dark and subtle message lurks beneath the surface.

Consider that the large audit networks have thrived on messages emphasizing the scope and strength of their international structures, and their capacity at scale to deliver seamless and efficient services to the participants in the global capital markets.

Those messages have persisted, despite an emphatic signal delivered in 2002, when the Arthur Andersen network collapsed in a matter of weeks. This occurred even though it was the most profitable and tightly-organized, with its partners enjoying the only globally integrated results-sharing model in the profession’s entire history. 

Which is to say — the largest six networks have now shown the capacity to surgically excise their Russian member firms, voluntarily and in a matter of days. That suggests — under-cutting the messaging of network unification as robust and tightly-bound (and shifting metaphors) — that the “ties that bind” may only be attached with slip-knots, or are spun of gossamer, able to being broken or snipped in an eye-blink by the scissors of exigent events.

I have long argued that the under-appreciated lesson in Andersen’s precipitous fall was that, far from being “too big to fail”, the surviving Big Four tetrapoly is “too fragile to survive.”[2]

That every one of these large networks was able to cut loose a member firm of significant size, swiftly and without obvious discord or repercussions, does not inspire confidence that a similar fate would not befall an organization under the stress of a government sanction or a litigation judgment at a level — easily foreseeable, given the size of recent well-known corporate failures — that would threaten the limited depth of its capital structure and its individual partners’ resources.

Modifying network structures that have included Russian member firms, over to on-going relationships with now free-standing Russian local firms, should work smoothly enough, considering the size of the Russian economy in an overall global context. Tightly knit as are the activities of the companies and the sources of capital that make up the large western economies, however, the case would be far different should a large network be forced to lose a local firm in, say, a G-7 country or a handful of others.  

That prospect is worthy of a discussion, when a post-wartime context allows, that deserves to be held explicitly and in full public view.

 

[1] By way of disclosure, my legal practice has for five decades been focused on the accountants. I was a partner in the Arthur Andersen worldwide organization and a senior member of its in-house legal group until the spring of 2001, and continue with on-going relationships both personal and professional.

[2] Please see, for example, my book, “Count Down: The Past, Present and Uncertain Future of the Big Four Accounting Firms” (Emerald Books 2d ed. 2017, pp. 45-64).

For more about this subject see an excellent summary of the issues, “Why the Big Four’s Russia Pullout Isn’t a Clean Break: Explained,” by Amanda Iacone and Michael Kapoor.

 

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Audit Market Caps in the United Kingdom – The Financial Times Fails a Math Test

 “The Glacial Pace of Audit Reform Needs To Speed Up”

The Financial Times might wish to reconsider this headline, above its editorial of late last week.

Global climate change considered, the metaphor may be more apt than intended, as the likely fate of the world’s glaciers is their tragic and accelerating collapse into muddy puddles amid massive fields of rocky rubbish.

The trope would match the UK government’s belated and sluggish response to the tumult surrounding Big Audit in the post-Carillion era. There are two main efforts in its consultation of this March, “Restoring Trust in Audit and Corporate Governance”: a floundering attempt to construct a legitimate audit regulator to succeed the shambolic Financial Reporting Council, and a single substantive proposal directly applicable to the audit firms -- “managed shared audits” for the FTSE 350 companies –- an unachievable idea that has failed to attract any measurable amount of serious support.  

The FT continues to urge a forced reduction of the Big Four’s dominance of FTSE 350 audits: a cap of 80%, within ten years time –- apparently recalibrating its earlier push for 60%.

For the premier English-language publication addressing business and the capital markets, with “Financial” as its very forename, it falls between perplexity and disappointment that the FT’s support for audit market caps pays no attention to the numbers –- bluntly, that the very structure of Big Audit makes impossible the role that would be thrust upon the unfortunately-described “challenger” audit firms.

The facts matter. Here a summary, using the market capitalization of the FTSE 350 companies as a proxy to measure the demands of personnel and resources required to perform large audit engagements:

First the FTSE 100, whose constituent companies’ total market capitalization is £ 1.814 trillion. Of these, the share of the “challenger” firms is zero. Of the far-smaller companies comprising the FTSE 250, their share is about twenty -- in flux although modestly expanded in the last year to some 9% of the total market capitalization of £ 394.6 billion or some £ 35.5 billion.

Combined across the two indices, the "challengers" hold an audit market share of the FTSE 350 by market capitalization of some 1.6%.

Into that reality, the growth necessary for the “challengers” to reach the 20% target urged by the FT may be measured in two ways:

• Yearly for ten years, they would have to add as clients a book of companies with total capitalization of some £ 41 billion –- more than double the size of their collective total client base today. That’s each and every year.

• Or, as an English major with a calculator can compute, to spread capacity-building gradually over the decade, they would have to achieve a year-on-year compound growth rate of 29%.

To this bleak picture, little needs be added. The underlying reasons why the “challengers” have no growth path on that impossible scale do not implicate performance quality. It’s personnel, expertise, geographic presence, and financial and risk support.[1] The stark numbers themselves tell the story -- it’s not going to happen.

Giving these figures no recognition, the FT presses a set of unlikely premises (all emphasis added):

First, the FT assumes a ten-year process “once the reforms are in place” –- a benchmark unanchored to the unlikely fulfillment of the government’s plans at all. So far there is no evidence of the legislation necessary to transform the FRC –- described by the acerbic Labour MP Rachel Reeves as “toothless and passive” –- while her pungent description might well apply to the government’s own process, given its “glacial” –- not to say backwards –- movement on the basics of populating the FRC’s board of directors and filling the office of chairman.[2]  

Second, the FT urges that smaller-company audits might be “assigned” to the “challengers” –- a prospect inconsistent with the obligation on both auditors and companies that client engagement acceptance be at the mutual judgment and acceptance of each.

Third, the FT describes the Big Four as “themselves split on the best way forward, though none is enthused by the government’s proposal for managed shared audits.” This, while perhaps not reaching the level of misrepresentation, mis-conveys what was more forthrightly surveyed by the FT’s own Michael O’Dwyer on August 15, that the Big Four “have refused to back” the proposal for shared audits.    

As reported by O’Dwyer, their message is clear enough, although if bobbing and weaving were an Olympic sport, the Big Four would be medal contenders: with the candor permissible behind closed doors, the take on shared audits would be somewhere between “no” and “hell no.”

Fairly put, however, the Big Four need not go publicly beyond the perhaps characteristic British euphemism. Given the UK government’s paralysis, their simply expressed distaste for shared audits –- a position held in common with the business community and indeed at least some of the “challengers” –- will adjourn any real confrontation with the impossibility of audit market caps to the arrival of the next global ice age.

Finally and most egregiously, the FT leaps to the position that “a transition period where challengers start to mature and incumbents give up a part of their dominant position is inevitable.”

No –- it is not. Several scenarios, no less unappealing, are at least as likely.

A wager on the more likely to first occur: as between actual achievement by the “challengers” of a 20% market share, or (i) the collapse or failure of one or more of the “challengers,” under the weight of their over-hanging litigation and performance quality issues or otherwise, so that their sector falls below critical mass, or (ii) the disintegration of another of the Big Four, as doomed Arthur Andersen in 2002, which would bring about the total collapse of today’s Big Audit model.  

If offered a voice, the world’s glaciers would opt for relief from the malign effects of human interference. No less, the inability of the editorial writers at the Financial Times to appreciate the actual structure of Big Audit impairs the value of their contribution to the discussion.

 

[1] For the details, please see my blog posts of April 21, 2021 and June 1, 2021, and the extended treatment in my book, “DOA: Can Big Audit Survive the UK Regulators?” (Amazon 2019).

[2] At this writing, the FRC’s interim chair is to leave in October, the full-time post being unfilled for over a year since its last occupancy for a mere eight months, while there are two new arrivals on the board and a second empty board seat (here).

 

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“Managed Shared Audits” in the UK – The Largest “Challengers” Think Not

What – they expected gratitude?

“Managed shared audits” were at the center of the UK government’s March 18 Consultation paper on audit reform. The proposal, aimed to loosen the Big Four’s dominant hold on the audits of the FTSE 350, would specifically benefit the smaller, wretchedly-designated “challenger” firms, by mandatory carve-out of ten to thirty percent of each newly-tendered audit to be gifted to the latter.

For reasons outlined here on April 21, and detailed in my short book on the post-Carillion environment in the UK,[1] the imposition of shared audits across the FTSE 350, never realistic, was fatally flawed and doomed to rejection. Quickly summarized: for the companies themselves, the process would be unmanageable, while the Big Four would gain nothing but valueless inflation of their costs, effort and liability exposure, and the smaller firms could never provide the necessary skills, personnel and capability.

One deservedly skeptical response to this offer –- another version of “We’re from the government, and here to help you” -- is now essentially confirmed. Instead of thankful appreciation, the UK firms of BDO and Grant Thornton – ranked fifth and sixth in the league tables – have recognized and spurned the government’s poisoned chalice. Their “no thanks” -- reported in the Financial Times of May 25 –- was spun diplomatically, as their “considering not pitching for work on shared audits of FTSE 100 companies….”

Their demurrer echoes the mordant humor of Abraham Lincoln, who captured the pain and frustration of the American presidency by likening his position to the man tarred and feathered and carried out of town on a rail – who, asked how he liked it, replied that “if it were not for the honor of the thing, he would much rather walk.”

As put to the FT by Grant Thornton’s head of audit, “If the challenger firm is just going to get what’s left at the bottom of the barrel, that’s not interesting and doesn’t help….”

Although the FT coyly suggests that the two firms “are considering focusing on increasing the number of FTSE 250 companies they audit,” Grant Thornton’s shared audit stand-down aligns with the reasons that underlay its 2018 decision “to stop bidding for audit contracts from Britain’s largest companies after concluding it is too difficult to compete with the Big Four firms that dominate the market.”

Clear perspective on the scale necessary to perform large complex audits reveals these implications, too important to ignore:

• First are the size comparisons illustrated by the 2020 revenues of BDO and Grant Thornton (globally $ 10.3 billion and $ 5.76 billion) –- fractions of the Big Four which range from KPMG at $ 29 billion to Deloitte’s table-topping $ 47.6 billion. The inhibitions on the “challengers” are not (necessarily) those of performance quality. Rather, as one FT reader incisively commented, a house carpenter may be perfectly competent to build a single-family home, but could not possibly qualify to build a high-rise tower.

• Second, in the other direction, BDO and Grant Thornton –- as the largest among the smaller -- were noted by the FT to “earn more UK audit fees in aggregate than the next 14 challengers combined.” Not only should their strategically rational risk and capacity assessments compel a reality check for their brethren down the size chart. In addition, their opting out of a shared audit regime emphatically rebuts the possibility that the remaining firms, however willing, could make up a critical mass of delivery capacity.  

The Consultation’s move for “managed shared audit” took a deliberate pass on even less achievable proposals, to enforce Big Four caps or market share re-distribution of the FTSE 350 audit sector. Its single idea so discredited, whither now?[2]

Fundamental re-engineering of large-company information assurance, guided by the insights of Sir Donald Brydon in his December 2019 “Independent Review Into the Quality and Effectiveness of Audit,” requires attention to the dysfunctionalities embedded in the current model. Those include the archaic and outmoded constraints on the scope of permissible auditor services, and the potentially fatal litigation impact on the firms’ financial and business structures, awaiting with the inevitable financial failures on the magnitude of Enron that disintegrated Arthur Andersen in 2002.

Assurance sufficiently extensive and flexible to be fit for today’s demands will remain beyond reach, until and unless the public dialog embraces discussion of these issues. Otherwise, as BDO and Grant Thornton have now confirmed, the dominance of the Big Four as presently configured –- even inhibited as they are by the golden handcuffs of their franchise -- is the only game in town.    

 

[1] “DOA: Can Big Audit Survive the UK Regulators” (Amazon 2019)

[2] One of the aggressive voices for mandated sector re-structuring was that of the Competition & Markets Authority, then led by since-departed Sir Andrew Tyrie. Even with its bust-up advocacy, the CMA’s April 2019 “Statutory Audit Services Market Study” gave legitimacy to the strategic reluctance of Grant Thornton to pursue FTSE 350 audits, conceding (¶ 3.135) that it “may be a rational reaction….”  

 

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Audit "Reform" in the UK: Hello…Is Anybody There?

Does anybody really know what time it is?

Does anybody really care?

-- The band Chicago’s debut album, 1969

 It’s one thing to discuss the breadth of the UK government’s March 18 consultation paper, “Restoring Trust in Audit and Corporate Governance,” with its 98 questions spread over 232 pages, as I did recently in a conference mixing academics and practitioners.

It’s quite another, and thoroughly dispiriting, to observe the public silence on the likelihood of sustainable change in the model for large-company audits, so roundly criticized since the fall of Carillion back in January 2018 – now more than three years ago.

On the available evidence, the Consultation is being kicked so far into the long grass that it would only be flushed by game drivers and a pack of hounds. One reason for pessimism is the absence of leadership and advocacy.

That’s disappointing, but no surprise. Transformative change always confronts the inertia, indifference, and resistance of those with self-interest in protecting the status quo.

For a list of those missing, start at the top. Kwasi Kwarteng, Boris Johnson’s cabinet secretary for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, has spent the last two months at photo ops and shout-outs on behalf of British business -- particularly life sciences, technology and renewable energy – without so much as a mention on his otherwise busy Twitter feed of the Consultation issued under his signature.

The flat-line level of commitment of Kwarteng and his boss at No 10 Downing Street is readable in the silence on audit reform within the legislative program presented by the Queen in her traditional speech on May 11 – an otherwise ambitious list spanning election schedules, national ID cards and NHS funding. That matters, because the Consultation would rely on Parliamentary action to address such major topics as the re-engineering of the audit regulator itself, extension of the duties and accountability of company directors, and the liability regime under which changes to the scope of assurance might be implemented.

Given the complex process in booking law-making time on Parliament's calendar, legislative silence today bespeaks extended future deferral at best, with likely default to indefinite inaction.

Further, while legislation for the replacement of the Financial Reporting Council lies in Parliamentary limbo, Sir Jon Thompson, chief executive of that discredited agency, has avoided taking the bully pulpit of his office to urge an activist role for his agency even under his place-holder leadership on the evolution of large-company reporting and assurance.

That multi-faceted topic, laid out in the perspicacious report offered in December 2019 by Sir Donald Brydon, “Independent Review Into the Quality and Effectiveness of Audit,” with its innovative proposal for the design and recognition of a newly-defined “corporate auditor,” lacks active sponsorship and looks unfortunately destined to gather dust. Sir Donald himself has done valuable and worthy service, but he speaks for no constituency – instead like Oscar Wilde arriving in America to confront its customs authorities, he has “nothing to declare but (his) genius.”

Elsewhere at the agency level, the aggressive position urged by the Competition & Markets Authority, that the dominant position of the Big Four in auditing the FTSE 350 should be forcibly reduced, is left for dead by the Consultation, while the author of that view, then-CMA chairman Andrew Tyrie, was defenestrated in 2020 and has since returned to his political consultancy with a London law firm.

Nor can minority support be expected from the political opposition. Acerbic Labour MP Rachel Reeves, who chaired a BEIS select sub-committee with an aggressive report of its own and who was razor-like in gutting evidence presented by the large firm leaders, has been booted up to the post of Shadow Chancellor.

As for the large firms themselves, sliced and diced at the Reeves committee hearings and on the receiving end of the perpetual scandal-driven question, “where were the auditors?” – it remains the case that ever since the firms locked up their public company assurance franchise with passage of the American securities laws in the early 1930s, the profession has been reactive and defensive in its uneasy relationship with the regulators – an attitude manifest in the UK today in their gentle maneuvering through the process of “operational separation” of their audit and advisory practices.

With all these players retreated to the wings – cometh the hour, cometh the man?

More likely, to adapt the query attributed to Richard Nixon’s secretary of state Henry Kissinger in his sarcastic frustration about talking to Europe – if in search for an effective audit reform advocate, whom should we call?

 

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Audit “Reform” in the UK – the Government Finally Speaks, and Says Little

On March 18, the UK government weighed in with its long-promised consultation paper (the “Consultation), “Restoring Trust in Audit and Corporate Governance.” Ninety-eight questions, spread over 232 pages, contain much that is cautious and little that is innovative. The problem is, what is cautious would not innovate, and what would innovate is not cautious.

For another day, the Consultation’s fulsome treatment of such worthy topics as the re-purposing of the UK’s audit regulator, the performance and accountability of corporate directors, and the very purpose of corporate information assurance. On the central topic of public concern since the failure of Carillion back in January 2018 -- the structure and performance of Big Audit itself -- the Consultation offers on only two items.

These are the “operational separation” of the Big Four’s audit and advisory practices, and the threatened imposition on FTSE 350 companies of “managed shared audits” – a novel concept unknown to either professional standards or actual practice.

The first is easily disposed of, as an insubstantial exercise in optics. The second, to be further discussed, is ill-conceived and deeply flawed.

“Operational separation” should have been recognized as a trifling matter the instant it was mooted (see § 6 of the April 2019 Final Report of the Competition & Markets Authority on its Statutory Audit Market Study).

That’s because the UK critics have neither the will nor the authority to force the Big Four networks to expel either of these core UK components from their global structures – disruptions that would disable them from the breadth of services demanded by the complex auditing of the world’s large public companies. Attempted “full legal separation” at the UK level, in other words, would be either or both legally impossible and globally inconsequential.

Moreover, it’s no surprise that the Big Four would accede to the Financial Reporting Council’s quest for public display of their audit leadership, governance and financial reporting. The simple reason was that they already had such structures and metrics in place -– essential tools for managing these four large businesses -- audit practices having published 2019 revenues of between £ 453 and £ 713 million.

Back to “managed shared audits” -- the Consultation contemplates (¶¶ 8.1.15-.16) that a FTSE 350 client of the Big Four would be obliged in its audit tender process to identify a “meaningful proportion” of its statutory audit -- not less than 10% and desirably closer to 30%, by metrics including audit fees, group revenues, assets and profits – to be performed by one of the so-called “challengers” – that is, a firm below the Big Four in size, yet brave enough to deem itself qualified to propose.    

Whisper who dares: in a triangular relationship among an issuing company, its lead auditor and a “challenger,” such an arrangement could satisfy none of the three.

Because the Consultation would not allow for joint bidding (¶ 8.1.17), a Big Four firm preparing to take the lead would start from an untenable position –- not even knowing the identity of the smaller firm, much less its qualifications, reputation or resources by either industry or geography. Despite which, that lead auditor would, under applicable professional standards and the liability regimes to which its global-level work and overall opinion would be exposed, bear full responsibility for the results of the group audit including the work performed and up-streamed by the “challenger.”

Passing for the moment whether such inhibitions would implicate a scope restriction on the lead auditor’s acceptance and planning (see International Standard on Auditing 300), a lead firm’s risk manager would have cardiac arrest at any lesser level of involvement than essentially 100% re-performance of the work of the “challenger.”

As for the company under audit, its management and audit committee could scarcely with comfort identify between 10% and 30% of its operations to be devolved for audit by a “challenger” whose capability and experience at the FTSE level would range from untested to non-existent.

Complicating the risk assessments of both the company and the lead auditor are two issues that inhere in the globalized nature of the large-company environment. First, a recent study estimates that 62% of the sales of FTSE 100 companies (and 35% for the FTSE 250) are generated in locations and operations outside the UK – beyond the geographic scope of a UK-based audit team. That means either that a “challenger” would be obliged to bring its own global resources to bear at the same level of multi-national scope and scale as its putative client – as the Big Four do now -- or that a company would essentially devolve what it could of its UK-based operations, leaving the lead auditor to carry out the ex-UK work and perform the eventual audit and reporting on the consolidation.

Also on the global front, affecting each leg of the triangle is the FTSE 350’s trading of their securities not just in the UK but in other major markets – especially the US where, as put in a recent cautionary article, American Depository Receipts are offered to investors “for over 200 UK companies including most of the country’s large cap companies.” The long US history of high-cost shareholder and other lawsuits presages liability exposures for which the “challengers” are woefully unequipped, and for which the Big Four would have no appetite to carry the burden of their smaller brethren.

Finally there is the unavoidable but compelling matter of the scale and capability of the “challengers” themselves – who audit none of the FTSE 100 and but ten of the next smaller FTSE 250 (see Figure 38, p. 48, of the Financial Reporting Council’s “Key Facts and Trends in the Accountancy Profession,” October 2020).  

In a 210-page Impact Assessment accompanying the Consultation, a model is cobbled together to support an aggressively optimistic position on the growth potential of the “challengers.” Using historical audit fee income for the five largest, ranging from 1% to 4% (page 127), a “conservative assumption (is made) that annual capacity growth of 2-4% can be safely sustained by challenger firms.”

Two problems – one of method and one of supply – are fatal.

For the first, the model disregards the Big Four-dominated growth of overall FTSE audit fees, as shown by two relevant data points: the 2018-2019 growth in Big Four audit fee income of 6.9% (page 46 of the FRC’s “Key Facts and Trends”) and the UK audit practice growth figures for 2020 reported separately by the Big Four, ranging from 3% to 8.7%.

Bluntly put – at the “challenger” growth rates assumed by the Consultation model, and the faster rates actually achieved by the Big Four -- the “challengers” would be losing market share, not gaining. Not assumed, but indeed omitted, would be the inability of the challengers in this zero-sum environment to grow relatively, enough faster than the Big Four to achieve an actual shift in their market share.

To which must be added a further and final point -- the supply side problem of the “challengers” to grow their necessary rosters of experienced partners. Within the Consultation’s timetable, their only available recruitment sources are the Big Four themselves, where individual partners would understandably question a poacher’s overture: reduced profitability and lower compensation, lesser industry experience and technical support, and uncertain financial resources in the face of expanded liability exposure.

The “managed shared audit” proposal would exacerbate those concerns -- because the partner-level obligations and responsibilities at a lead firm would expand in the execution of an engagement involving a “challenger.”

That is, in a single-firm engagement, a signing partner (and the other partners on a complex job) have the benefit of the coherence, cohesion and efficiency of working with a team of subordinates sharing a common set of methodologies, documentation, vocabulary and communications. Delegations can be made, and expectations set, in the relative confidence of shared membership in a common enterprise.

Not so, where that lead partner would be obliged to receive, review, and accept ultimate responsibility for ten to thirty percent of an engagement as staffed and performed by strangers – for which there could be no solution but to increase dramatically the level of partner time, energy, and attention.

At the broad market level, such a shared-audit concern would anticipate major partner-driven fee increases at the lead firm. At the personal level, Big Four audit partners would expect to see their value enhanced, not diminished, by the forced carving out of portions of their FTSE company portfolios – with a concomitant further reduction in a poacher’s attractiveness.

Shot through as the Consultation is with other failures and short-comings of vision – to be addressed here anon – it is earnestly to be hoped that its proposal of “managed shared audit” will promptly and deservedly be dismissed as impractical and unachievable, lest it crash in unintended consequences if an attempt is actually made to put it in place.

 

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Is Audit Reform Truly a UK Priority? Good Luck With That

Kwasi Kwarteng wasted no time, upon taking office on January 8 as the UK’s new Secretary of State of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, in asserting that audit reform was “one of his initial priorities.”

The sounds of earnest innocence might be rather touching, from a government servant, freshly elevated from his Energy remit to become chief minder of the entire sprawling BEIS portfolio. Forbearance for a learning curve may be indicated, as reinforced by a CV that does not reveal experience with the issues afflicting Big Audit.

For the moment, however, and presuming good in Kwarteng’s intentions, queries on his earliest signals are in order. See his first Twitter message, following one of appreciation for his appointment – shouting out a £ 10 million investment to support carbon emissions reduction by the whiskey distillers (@kwasikwarteng), as “something we can all raise a glass to.”

Unfair to compare -- few glasses have ever been raised to salute the auditors, in the centuries since the invention of double-entry bookkeeping. But neither did audit reform rate a mention in the BEIS coverage of Kwarteng’s January 11 telephonic discussion of his priorities with five different British business organizations.

Post-Brexit trade relations with the EU and the state of the COVID vaccine roll-out naturally headed that list, on which audit reform did not appear – these having pre-occupied Kwarteng’s short-lived predecessor in office, Alok Sharma. Which said, the realities underlying the intense criticism of Big Audit in the UK that erupted with the collapse of Carillion in January 2018 now confront the anodyne language of the new Secretary’s introduction.

Government response is awaited to a quartet of reports – Sir John Kingman (December 18, 2018) on the manifold inadequacies of the Financial Reporting Council; the Competition & Markets Authority (April 18, 2019) on the Big Four’s audit market concentration at the FTSE 350 level; the BEIS select committee chaired by MP Rachel Reeves (April 2, 2019); and the extended inquiry by Sir Donald Brydon (December 2019) on the purpose of audit.

While the critics’ array of proposed “solutions” are shelved pending official response, further outbreaks of financial scandal and irregularities, litigation and regulatory impositions have added to the intensity of public interest – both in the UK (e.g., Thomas Cook, NMC Health, Patisserie Valerie, Autonomy) and globally (e.g., Gupta, Steinhoff, Wirecard).

What confronts the prospects and the credibility of Secretary Kwarteng, unhappily, is that he brings to the battle a distinct lack of weapons. As explored in detail in my 2019 book – “DOA: Can Big Audit Survive the UK Regulators?” (Amazon) – there is quite simply nothing in the legislative or regulatory armory that can be deployed to effect fundamental change in Big Audit as presently configured.

In summary:

• Re-engineering of the FRC, decried as “toothless and useless,” into the new Audit, Reporting and Governance Authority, is hostage to necessary legislation, and in any event is aimed not at auditor performance itself but at a regulator whose impact is at best secondary and retrospective.
• Attempts to expand competition with the Big Four, by injecting the so-called “challenger firms” into either joint or shared engagements or by actual forced re-distribution of audit mandates – neither ever justified on the basis of audit quality impact – more importantly confronts the reality of the smaller firms’ limitations in size, resources, geographic scope and risk-taking capacity and tolerance.
  • Auditor changes for troubled companies, in the post-Carillion era, do not indicate optimism that those limitations are subject to relief. The replacement of Grant Thornton by RSM as auditor of Sports Direct (since re-named Frasers Group) in October 2019, after weeks of non-compliance, and the December 2020 replacement by Boohoo of PwC with the much smaller Littlejohn firm of the PKF network, do not signal endorsement that the capacity of the “challengers” is adequate to the task.
• As for the ability of the Big Four to house the ancillary skills necessary to perform audits for the world’s complex companies, in the face of calls that they should be “broken up,” the UK regulators retreated to a process of “operational separation” of the audit practices – not only because full legal separation would have been a reach too far for the UK authorities, but because the negotiated optics-oriented adjustments to the large firms’ branding, governance and internal resource deployment were readily within reach.   

To emphasize – the impotence of Kwarteng and his fellows in the face of Big Audit’s intractable issues does not counsel either cynicism or despair. The world’s capital markets will continue to seek financial information assurance that is both relevant and dependable.

The Brydon report points the way, although not without heavy lifting, as Sir Donald understandably declined to wrestle with several fundamental challenges – notably the audit firms’ presently limited financial and structural stability and the related limitations of archaic rules on independence and permissible scope of practice.

One way or another, those will be solved. Perhaps by another litigation-driven collapse, as with Arthur Andersen in 2002, and replacement of the current model with newly organized and emergent suppliers. Or, desirably but much less likely, by the collective and collaborative efforts of all the relevant players to make the deep and necessary changes.

But not, it must be said, by Secretary Kwarteng. To him, as his day of reality and reckoning awaits, the best and only offer is “good luck.”

 

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For Chinese Companies -- “Double Secret Probation”?

With appreciation to my friend and colleague Francine McKenna, this guest contribution is up today on her newsletter, The Dig -- to which readers here are enthusiastically invited -- and contact her at [email protected].

 

 

When in need of street wisdom, legendary Chicago columnist Mike Royko called on his bar-stool pal Slats Grobnik.

Not even Slats could explain what has possessed the United States Senate – which on May 20 passed the Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act – which would expel Chinese companies from the American capital markets because their auditors are shielded by the Chinese regulators from the oversight and inspection program of America’s audit regulator, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.

As the world’s greatest deliberative body – so goes the cliché – the fractious Senate can barely muster bi-partisan agreement on the time of day – so passage of the HFCA by unanimous resolution must elicit skepticism about whether there are adults minding the playroom.

The Act first plays to the chest-thumping China hawks – Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer and economic advisers Larry Kudlow and Peter Navarro. It would require a Chinese company seeking access to the American capital markets to certify that “it is not owned or controlled by a governmental entity….” That provision -- so susceptible to gaming that Slats would guffaw over his beer -- pictures a trench-coated character out of John le Carré, peddling a fistful of “no control” certificates -- facially valid and untraceable in provenance.

For two reasons, though, Slats would truly slap his forehead over the Act’s second bit: a Chinese company would loose its US listing and its shares would be barred from US trading, if the PCAOB were unable for three years running to access its auditor and its working papers under the auditor inspection program put into place by the Sarbanes Oxley law of 2002 and activated by extension to ex-US auditors in 2005.

For starters, even though since first requested the Chinese have consistently forbidden PCAOB auditor inspection, the enforcement armory of the American securities regulators has long had the necessary weapons locked, loaded, and zeroed in. Launch of the inevitable Chinese/American diplomatic and trade apocalypse has – at least on paper -- needed no more to pull the trigger than the order of an authorized zealot – one of the noted hawks or, even and perhaps better in these over-heated times, theocratic and rapture-ready Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.

Here’s the short guided tour through the existing arsenal:

• Sarbanes Oxley § 102(a) and PCAOB Rule 2100 require auditors reporting on an issuer’s financial statements to be registered.

• Under Sarbanes Oxley § 104(a), auditor registration includes and requires a registered firm to submit to the PCAOB’s inspection process, including access to personnel and working papers.

• Sanctions for non-compliance include revocation of a registration, under Sarbanes Oxley § 105 (see the PCAOB’s orders relating to PKF (Hong Kong) (January 12, 2016), Crowe Horwath (HK) CPA Limited (July 25, 2017), and Anthony Kam & Associates Limited (November 28, 2017).

• Audit reports by a de-registered firm may not thereafter be included in an issuer’s SEC filings (see the SEC’s Financial Reporting Manual § 4115.1).

• The obligations of a principal auditor using or relying on the work of another audit firm – whether or not that firm is referred to (Manual § 4104.1-.5), or must itself be registered (under the “substantial role” threshold of Rule 1001(p)(ii)) – include the production of work papers and other documents related to that firm’s work (see PCAOB Staff Questions and Answers on Audits of Mainland China Issuers By Registered Firms Outside of Mainland China, December 30, 2016).

• Further, a non-US firm on which a principal auditor relies, whether or not registered, must under Sarbanes Oxley § 106(b)(2) produce its work papers on request and designate a US agent for service of PCAOB or SEC process.      

• Finally, because the financial statements of an issuer in the US may only be reported upon by a registered auditor (Sarbanes Oxley § 102(a)) – the consequences are as summarized in a recent blog post from the Columbia Law School (emphasis added):    

“Companies that fail to file within the allowed grace period are subject to a variety of costly penalties, including deregistration by the SEC, delisting by stock exchanges, the inability to raise capital through issuance of public securities, and potential debt covenant violations.”

With all that authority already in place to bar Chinese companies from US trading of their securities, the questions Slats Grobnik would press—caring no more about the grimy details of the law-making process than he would the ingredients in a classic Chicago hot dog – would be:

• What could they be thinking -- against the immediately predictable blowback from the Chinese securities regulator to a proposal “directly targeted at China…(that) … politicizes securities regulation”?

• Why now, having welcomed for fifteen years the listings of some of the world’s largest companies – the likes of Alibaba and PetroChina and China Life and China Telecom – while the inevitable emergence of a scandal on the order and scale of Luckin Coffee has been predictable the entire time?

• And has anyone the moxie to do it?

That last is not to be ignored -- the question who would do the dirty and disruptive work of de-registering auditors and stripping Chinese companies of their US listings. The weapons exist and are at the ready -- not so the boots on the ground. This administration’s lack of confidence in the PCAOB was manifest in its clean sweep of all five board members and the gutting of its senior staff, and this March, a budget proposal to eliminate the PCAOB altogether and roll up into the SEC whatever remaining modest scope of its politically permissible activities might survive.

Nor does SEC chairman Jay Clayton have standing as the fire-breathing regulator needed and committed to wage the hawks’ holy war. In his background is the record-breaking $ 25 billion IPO of Alibaba in 2014, featured among the big deals of his pre-SEC life as a partner in the heavyweight firm of Sullivan & Cromwell – while in his current position, he offers only frustrated reminders to investors of the limits of his agency’s timorous reactions to the on-going Chinese rebuffs.

The search for coherent thinking behind the HFCA becomes even more muddled, in looking for consistency in the justification by Senator John Kennedy (R.-La.), the bill’s principal sponsor, in the Congressional Record: “We are excruciatingly transparent. We like investors throughout the world to know what they are buying.”

Slats again – Izzat so? Then what do investors know about the operations in China of, for two quick examples:

• Caterpillar, which shows seven manufacturing and distribution locations in China in its Form 10-K for 2019, is estimated to derive some 5% of its $ 53.8 billion in global revenue from that country.

• Apple, which for the first quarter of 2020 rang up revenue in China of $ 13.6 billion -- 14.8% of its total global revenue of $ 213 billion.

High-ranking American companies – audited respectively by the US firms of the PwC and EY networks. Neither auditor explicitly shows use or reliance on the work of their colleague firms in Hong Kong or China, although both would be subject to the legal and regulatory obligations noted above – to maintain and produce information – but only if “on request.”

How long would we hold our breath, waiting to know whether Chairman Clayton’s foot soldiers might “request” access to the audit work scrutinizing those billions of China-based revenue? Slats’s lament for his beleaguered Chicago Cubs – the perennial and off-putting “just wait till next year” – extended a fulsome five score and eight years.

A long political step too far, for Senator Kennedy to extend what consistency of logic there may be in his HFCA, to benefit the investors he claims to favor, by reaching for access to the China-based audit work supporting the American firms’ reporting on the financial statements of ex-Chinese companies that include their large operations there. Nor, presumably, would it suit the China-bashers. Audits covering the operations in China of Cat or Apple are no less opaque to PCAOB inspection than those of Alibaba or PetroChina – but where would the sponsors of the HFCA see the pay-off in picking that fight?

The Senate’s headlong rush portends a reprise of the enactment of Sarbanes Oxley itself. As I wrote in the now-lamented International Herald Tribune on July 20, 2002, about that law’s equally lamentable passage, “any legislation receiving the bipartisan margin of 97-0 is bound to be fundamentally defective.”

That assessment has been well vindicated, by two decades of small-bore and ineffective behavior by a body whose mission would have been at least as well executed under existing laws, regulations, and behavior modification by the sector itself. As Slats would say, “here we go again.”

It does not inspire confidence that a version of the Senate-passed HFCA was promptly introduced in the lower chamber. The warning from Will Rogers is stark:

“Ancient Rome declined because it had a Senate. Now what’s going to happen to us with both a House and a Senate?”

Might good sense intrude? Elected officials definitely have the authority to inflict the HFCA – otiose and pernicious as it would be. But a strategy of “ready – fire – aim” cannot repeal the impact of the still-valid Law of Unintended Consequences.

 

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A Valedictory for My Students: Keep the Bar High

My law school teaching in Paris -- “Risk Management and Decision-Making” -- is wrapping up for the spring semester. Classes at ZOOM distance are finished – final papers and grade submission await. To my regret, on-going lock-down means I will miss the students’ graduation, unable to deliver my appreciation in person.

Here is a message of congratulations and encouragement I would have offered:

“Our course sought to be a testing ground – a gathering of professionals with a performance bar as it would be in the real world. It’s now your opportunity to stand tall out there and deliver, with the same focus, energy and confidence you showed to me.”

I assume and expect excellence from students – as would a supervisor, a manager or a client. In the worlds of business and the professions, there is neither time nor tolerance for less. Just as it is not acceptable for an employee to turn in a report or a project with the preface, “I’m not sure if this is what you wanted….” – I want students to ask, if a discussion topic has been obscure or they see an ambiguity in an assignment or a test.

Clarifying questions show both curiosity and interest, and a shared commitment to the efficient use of time and energy. In both contexts: understand what’s expected – do the necessary research – draft and edit until the result is your best work.

And bring best efforts – the classroom should be preparation for the workplace. So it was, back when I was among the eighty law students who filled the old-style amphitheater of my largest first-year class. There we were obliged to recite on our feet, knees knocking, in response to the professor’s intimidating summons and pointed finger: “You – stand up and make a noise like a lawyer.”  

For a professional to do any less is to detract from stature, credibility and effectiveness. Examples abound:

Take the attempted ploy, “I’m just a small-town lawyer” and its distasteful equivalent in other fields. No perceptive adversary needs to be told. If truly the case, a real yokel will be revealed immediately. If not, the rule not to under-estimate an opponent means that while competence will be apparent, an attempt to be disarming but obviously disingenuous will be seen as insincere and untrustworthy.  

Related was my experience with a newly arrived corporate general counsel – by his admission from a transactional background and unfamiliar with disputes and litigation. His self-effacing introduction was along the lines, “I’m new here, and you know this is not my background.” He did himself no favors. Instead he invited the assessment of his peers that he had not done his work, was indeed not qualified, and never had his views given the weight and credibility he thought he deserved.

Not to suggest that there is anything wrong with an appropriate degree of restraint and humility. Boastfulness will be revealed all too soon as well, when results have spoken; as baseball legend Dizzy Dean said, “it ain’t bragging, if you can do it.” Or as the story goes of ancient Greece, you never asked a man if he was from Sparta – if he was, you’d have known it, and if not, you’d hurt his feelings by asking.

In these days of physical isolation and distance communication there’s a new form of avoidable self-inflicted wound: the footer on the message or the e-mail – “please excuse my typos” or “kindly forgive the orthography and erroneous auto-corrects.”

Don’t do it. True there are no virtue points for an error-free message – because that’s what’s expected from a professional anyway. But neither is there a license for sub-standard work. An advance disclaimer only draws attention and closer scrutiny. Put attention instead into extra editing – fix the weaknesses in logic and presentation, over-ride the errant auto-corrects, and catch the typos rather than apologize for them.    

To my smart and appealing students, then, with regret we have not been on campus together:

“Godspeed – keep it up -- all success to you, out there where a world of opportunity awaits.”

 

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RIP Paul Volcker (1927-2019) – There Was One Wreck He Couldn’t Salvage

The out-pouring of encomia for Paul Volcker, who has died at age 92, would tower over even his own formidable 6 ft. 7 in. (e.g., samples in the Financial Times and the New York Times).

His credits over more than forty years include the taming of the rampant inflation of the 1980s as Federal Reserve chairman and, post the 2007-2008 financial crisis, the articulation of an eponymous “rule” aimed at the proprietary trading excesses of the investment bankers.

One effort for which he will be little remembered was his ill-fated aspiration to forestall the Enron-driven collapse in 2002 of the Arthur Andersen accounting firm. His proposed “rescue” – floated for three months in the winter of 2002 but effectively dead in the water from the moment of its launch – would have included a cleansing replacement of its leaders with management selected by a new outside board, shrinkage of the firm to “audit only” scope, and negotiations led by his own virtuous self to resolve the Damoclean legal exposures brought by the government and civil litigants.

The Andersen drama included hubris enough to fill a Greek theater: its leaders’ cries of innocence even amid the rubble of its reputation, voracious law enforcement agents displaying their punitive prosecutorial DNA, the plaintiff’s lawyers ratcheting upward their own demands.    

And Volcker himself – boldly taking the stage to reprise a familiar role, only to discover that the script made demands beyond his repertoire.

Volcker’s quixotic effort was doomed from the outset, by a trifecta of insurmountable barriers:

• The fragility of Andersen’s organization, as a global network of national partnerships which, lacking the cohesion of a corporate structure supported by shareholder capital, was hostage to the rapid and fatal erosion of individual partner trust, confidence, and mutual commitment.
• The unwillingness of Andersen’s senior leaders to surrender their positions of stature, remuneration and accountability, to be displaced by an outsider from a different profession, however grise his éminence.  
• Above all, the unsustainable impact of the multi-billion dollar litigation exposure inflicted on Andersen’s limited capital resources – a mortal blow the instant it fell, that made futile any rescue attempt as too little and too late to stop the disintegration already begun.

One legacy of Volcker’s failed mis-adventure is worth recalling today, in the currently fraught environment in which the structure and business model of the surviving Big Four firms are under existential threat from politicians and regulators, particularly in the UK.[1] That is, Volcker’s ambitious but benighted initiative was incorporated into the report issued on April 1, 2008, by the US Treasury Department’s Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession – inspiring the report’s straight-faced suggestion that the audit firms’ governance should include a mandatory management-replacement program in the event of a disintegration threat.

That the Committee’s entire body of deliberations and pronouncements promptly faded without a trace – its risible Volckeresque proposal included – suffices to capture the inadequacies that inhered in the failed attempt at Andersen.

Meanwhile in its aftermath, fresh outbreaks of financial malfeasance mark the passage of the years since the disruptions of the financial crisis of 2007-2008, with intense public criticism rather than the introduction of sustainable “solutions” dominating the debate around the fitness of the current Big Audit model.

Paul Volcker himself was never heard to admit that he lacked sufficient appreciation of the issues to comprehend the futility of his efforts. A dose of that humility would have spared him a conspicuous failure. If true for a figure of his considerable stature, the same would be prudent today for those critics tempted to prescribe impracticalities far beyond their own vision and competence.

 

[1] For which, please see my book of this May, “DOA: Can Big Audit Survive the UK Regulators?” (Amazon 2019).

 

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What’s Hot in Big Audit? October 4th at the ICAEW in London

A major up-dating is set for October 4 at the London home of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales – its 2019 Audit Conference, “Reflect, Reform, Refocus.” Proceedings will be reported in the next issue of its magazine Audit & Beyond – but live attendance on Friday will be worth it.

The context is volatile and challenging. Relevant current events include:

• The September 23 collapse of venerable travel operator Thomas Cook, this time with a gloss on the expected query -- “Where was EY?” -- that features the absence of a “going concern” qualification in its 2017 and 2018 opinions.
• The on-going noncompliance of Mike Ashley’s Sports Direct with the requirement, unfulfilled since its September 8 Annual General Meeting, that the company find an auditor willing to succeed Grant Thornton.
• And the persistent silence of the Competition & Markets Authority, following its April 18 report, which proposed that most of the FTSE 350 should be obliged to engage a second audit firm, selected from among the so-called “challengers.”

These items of immediate attention are piled on those of recent months, in addition to the CMA’s report – the report by Sir John Kingman on December 18, 2018, which set up the on-going process of rehabilitating the Financial Reporting Council into a new Audit, Reporting and Governance Authority, and the April 2, 2019, report of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy committee of Parliament with its calls for yet more aggressive steps to force a reduction in the near-total large company audit dominance of the Big Four, break up the Big Four, or hobble the scope and skills of their audit practices.

The morning keynote speaker at the ICAEW conference will be Sir Donald Brydon, expected to bring the world up-to-date – albeit with sensitivity and due regard for protocols and discretion – on the state of his mission, launched in December 2018 by the Business Secretary, to inquire and report on “the Quality and Effectiveness of Audit.”

Views on the broad range of concerns will be offered by speakers from practitioners, the standard-setters, and the regulators – see its programme.

I will be there, with a few words to offer. No spoiler alerts are needed – the grounds and reasons for my skepticism about the mooted “reforms” are laid out in my book of this May, short but detailed -- “DOA: Can Big Audit Survive the UK Regulators?”

For those unable to be in Chartered Accountants’ Hall on the 4^th, my perspectives on the issues derive in good part from this single graphic, showing the global accounting networks with 2018 revenue greater than $ 500 million.

Anyone paying attention to the implications of this array, and still clinging to the belief that either joint audits or forced market share re-allocation can be achieved, is invited to bring forth the arguments. Presentation space will be offered here, free and in full – fairly warned that the section will be labeled “Fiction and Fantasy.”

 

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My New Book -- "DOA: Can Big Audit Survive the UK Regulators?"

It is a pleasure to announce the availability of my new book -- "DOA: Can Big Audit Survive the UK Regulators?" -- now available in paperback and e-reader versions through Amazon -- here. 

To summarize the story, which is little enough comprehended even in the United Kingdom, and both seriously under-reported and much misunderstood in the United States and elsewhere:

"The collapse of Arthur Andersen in 2002 reduced the large accounting networks to the Big Four – Deloitte, EY, KPMG and PwC. Can they survive, in a model fit for purpose?

 "Public criticism and the hostility of regulators and politicians are intense, especially in the United Kingdom since the January 2018 collapse of contracting giant Carillion. The debate is joined, the outcome is uncertain, and the consequences to the capital markets will be profoundly disturbing.

"The issues are complex: audit quality, the 'expectations gap,' competition and choice. Disruptive 'solutions' include breaking up the Big Four, stripping their people and services back to 'audit only,' and even nationalizing audit assignments. 

"DOA surveys the background to the current UK environment, examines the possible actions, and assesses the doubtful prospects for beneficial change." 

By its focus, in the current volatile British environment, on the political, regulatory and litigation risks that swirl globally around the Big Four, DOA is a sequel to the detailed scrutiny of these issues in my earlier and still-relevant book, "Count Down: The Past, Present and Uncertain Future of the Big Four Accounting Firms" (Emerald Books, 1st ed. 2015, revised and extended paperback edition 2017 -- also on Amazon).  

The certainty of global implications for the continuing availability of assurance on the financial information of the world's large public companies, including the stability and viability of the Big Four themselves, makes broadly relevant the actions and decisions of the regulators and politicians in the UK. 

I invite your attention to the examination in DOA of these important issues. Please share with friends and colleagues. Comments here via the Main page, and reactions and suggestions to me at [email protected], are invited and most welcome.

 

Failure Study: Can Auditors Get Better?

“How can you hope to improve, if you can’t tell whether you’re good or not?”

My article, Failure Study: A Needed Addition to the Accounting Toolkit, is just out in the March edition of the CPA Journal, published by the New York State Society of CPAs.

With my thanks to editor-in-chief Rick Kravitz and his team, a direct link is here. And because not all readers here would have the Journal on their lists, it’s my pleasure to offer it in PDF below.

Here's the theme: the accounting profession lacks a forum by which to examine its instances of questionable performance, for lessons to be learned and opportunities to improve.

While “failure study” is an article of faith, deeply embedded and pursued in many other sectors – medical care, engineering, aviation safety and operations, manufacturing processes – the accounting profession has found reasons, if not justifications, not to join.    

For context, recent months have seen refreshed examples, circling the globe with intensified criticism, that repeat the invariable question – “Where were the auditors”:

• The January 2018 collapse of contracting giant Carillion in the United Kingdom, arousing regulators, politicians and media alike.
• Money laundering through the Estonian branch of Danske Bank.
• Falsified transactions at South Africa–based Steinhoff.
• The looting of Malaysia’s 1MDB fund.
• Litigation in Japan by shareholders of Toshiba.
• In the US, criminal proceedings relating to information theft and mis-use by PCAOB employees and senior personnel at KPMG, and PwC’s settlement of the FDIC’s judgment relating to Colonial Bank.

As spelled out in the Journal article, the structure and remit of an effective failure study forum are available, for the value it could bring to an assurance model now under challenges – from these examples and any number of others -- of trustworthiness, stability and fitness for purpose.

The conceded difficulty would be one of implementation, involving all the participants in the Big Audit model. Nothing less would be required than broad cooperation and buy-in -- from issuers of financial information, users in the capital markets, the accounting firms providing assurance, standard setters, legislators, and regulators and law enforcement agencies.

Discussion and debate – reactions and comments – are invited and welcome.

Download CPAJFailureStudy

 

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Facing the British Politicians – A Strategy for the Big Four

The Big Four accounting firms, under intense pressure in London and with their business model at risk, have at most limited influence. A possible strategy in the face of political and regulatory animosity lies in the folk tale found in many cultures -- the clever rabbit, who evades his dire fate at the hands of the voracious fox by pleading not to be thrown into the briar patch.

It would seem so, watching the televised January 30 session of Parliament’s Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, on “The Future of Audit.”

The Committee focused on the recommendations in the market study by the Competition & Markets Authority and the review led by Sir John Kingman. While other ideas were tabled, the two headline prospects seem to be: (i) mandatory “joint auditors,” for all but the largest of the FTSE 350 companies, to include the “challengers” – firms below the size of the Big Four – or (ii) compelled reduction of the Big Four’s dominant 97% market share.

Passed over here for possible later attention is the genial shared attitude toward the Kingman recommendations to replace and re-engineer the Financial Reporting Council (see the hearing broadcast at 10.51, 11.04). The track record of the profession’s regulators considered – and images of the crew re-arranging deck chairs on the Titanic are difficult to resist -- supplanting one bureaucratic structure with another appeared not important enough to be worth resisting.

With the Committee’s eager desire to “get on with it” (see 10.59, 11.59), either of these options would have fundamental impact. So it is worth a comparison, from the perspective of the firms both large and smaller.

Witnesses from the Big Four all expressed opposition to a regime of mandatory joint audits, citing:

• The absence of evidence that participation of a second audit firm actually achieves an improvement in audit quality (11.08, 11.29).
• The absence of joint auditor value as shown by the lack of uptake in markets where it is an available but unused option (11.29).
• The record of joint audits in France, the single country where local politics creates particular conditions in the legal and governance regimes (10.50, 11.29), and where it has not opened that market beyond the limited share of a single challenger firm (11.29).

In addition, as a risk issue for Big Four incumbents but also a Trojan Horse for the challengers expected to act jointly, the prospect cannot be avoided of added cost, complexity and performance quality risk (10.46, 11.11). Two reasons:

• First, while the challengers asserted their professional capability to perform, they admitted to significant issues with the expansion to scale of their personnel and expertise capacity (10.01, 10.48).
• Second, under the CMA’s proposal the challengers would not only take on significant basic audit work. They would also conclude and opine separately on an issuer’s top-level financial statement consolidation (see 10.04) – a risk with particular liability implications for audit opinions issued into the litigation-prone Anglo securities markets, the US in particular.

For purposes here and absent satisfactory research either way, the challengers’ position on capability may be taken on faith – although the UK record-setting judgment of £ 21 million awarded on January 31 against Grant Thornton over its audits of Assetco, along with the furor over Grant client Patisserie Valerie’s apparent £ 40 million in falsifications and irregularities, serve the point that audit performance by the challengers is not demonstrably superior to that of the Big Four.

With the steely cynicism expressed by Rachel Reeves as Committee chair, on the expectation of fraud detection in the audit of “a shop that sells tea and cakes” (10.32), the Committee did introduce a new cliché into the never-ending antagonism between auditors and information users.  

As noted, and as against the unanimity of Big Four opposition to mandatory joint audits, the large firms’ attitude toward market caps and the surrender of some significant portion of their large-company clients seemed almost benign (11.07-.08, 11.11, 11.28) – for which there are also several reasons:

First, a share reduction from 97% to around 75% might contemplate the shifting of perhaps 60 to 70 engagements over several years time -- each of the Big Four giving up some 15 to 20 jobs.

That’s a modest enough number, especially since the specifics would involve the complex gamesmanship of a four-way dialog among (i) an incumbent Big Four auditor; (ii) the companies identified as candidates, whose audit committees would have to be satisfied with the adequacy of a replacement; (iii) one or more tendering challengers, who would have to demonstrate both the ability to present a satisfactory tender in the first place and execution capability and capacity in the event of success; and (iv) the newly-constituted agency supplanting the current FRC, which itself would be required to ramp up to evaluate and approve the entire process (see 11.09, 11.12).

From the Big Four perspective, the unlikelihood that such a multi-party exercise could be launched and effectively operational within a time span measured in less than a generation would make participation an option with modest risk and more than adequate opportunities to manage to advantage.

All the more, as the Committee seemed to use a metric for selected movement based on head-count (11.07, 11.11), with the consequence that the companies selected for shifting would concentrate at the bottom end of the FTSE 350 scale.

Such a metric might raise an issue of optics and political acceptability, as the companies comprising the bottom quintile of the index by size account for only about 2.5% of its total £ 2.45 trillion in market capitalization. On the other hand, the question is daunting whether the challenger firms could, over any reasonable time span, ever build the capacity or assume the risk profile to take on the company population necessary to represent 20% of the FTSE 350 by capitalization.

To summarize the risk evaluation of a Big Four firm as between the options: A market cap would mean shedding 100% of the liability and exposure involved in the audits of a score or so of smaller-company engagements – with those devolved to challengers willing to accept that start-up issues in the first years of new engagements are well-recognized for maximum risk of failure. Offered a choice, for the Big Four, that risk-mitigating option would seem preferred over the intrusion into their entire portfolios of mandated joint auditors.

Why a challenger firm would want such a supposedly positive opportunity is another matter. Competing each year for the chance to take on an additional half dozen new jobs apiece – all of them larger than anything presently done – with the “early years” challenges and the prospect that any single blow-up on the scale of a Patisserie Valerie could be fatal to their limited financial resources – leadership would need to be bold indeed.

Forced to choose between unattractive options, in short, the Big Four’s strategy to support market caps would adapt from the animal kingdom the rabbit’s view of the briar patch.

Different for the challengers, for whom perhaps better suited is the supposed advice to her daughter by the wife of Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin, on managing a young suitor’s predatory advances. Drawing on her own experience, Lucy Baldwin is quoted:

“Just close your eyes and think of England.”

 

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Serious Changes in Big Audit? Not From The UK’s Labour Party

As London debates over the future of Big Audit, there is a minor diversion from the hefty tomes released on December 18 by the Competition & Markets Authority and the committee charged by Parliament and headed by Sir John Kingman.

Their proposals will elicit levels of sound and fury: the Kingman committee would trash the Financial Reporting Council and re-build the country’s audit regulation, and the CMA’s two-fer would inflict organizational separation on the audit practices of the large firms, and oblige FTSE 350 companies to endure “joint audits” with the participation of non-Big Four firms.

Further attention is promised, under the government-sponsored “Project Flora,” to be headed by London Stock Exchange chairman Donald Brydon, and by the Parliament’s Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, whose first session is scheduled for January 15.

So take passing note that on December 13 the Labour party’s shadow chancellor John McDonnell brought forth his own report – 170 pages of perfervid criticism of the history and performance of the Big Four firms. More qualified scholars will assess its legitimacy as research, while from a real-market perspective, and drained of its hyperbolic antagonism, the extended screed reduces to a menu of proposals of eye-watering impracticality.

While it appears accepted by all parties that dependable assurance on the financial statements of the world’s large companies continues to be valued by the capital markets, here are only two illustrations of the report’s departure from that context’s reality:

• “Big Four firm share of the audits of FTSE 350 companies must be capped at 50% of that market” (p. 91).
• “A new statutory body, equivalent to the National Audit Office (would) conduct real-time audits of banks, building societies, credit unions, insurers and major investment firms” (p. 70).

Neither position found favor in the CMA or Kingman reports. But the prospect of political up-take makes it useful to explore briefly the fatally flawed nature of each.

First, reduction of the Big Four’s dominant 97% market share of FTSE 350 audits would crash headlong into a stark reality: although misguided regulators have the power to legislate some sort of “market cap,” they have no answer to the question, “who would actually do the work?”

Various metrics make the same point, starting with a graphic and league table published here on September 25 and November 12 that illustrate the overwhelming scale issue: the demands of a large-company audit are simply beyond the smaller firms’ capacity in personnel, industry expertise, global presence and risk tolerance.

Looked at a different way -- the measure of materiality agreed by KPMG for Barclay’s 2017 audit was £ 225 million – compared with the latest audit practice revenues of the six UK firms below the Big Four, set out in the Labour report itself (p.22) as ranging from £ 155 million down to £ 27 million.

The two largest erstwhile candidates to supplant the Big Four have agreed. Grant Thornton, fifth-ranked by size in the UK before giving effect to the BDO/Moore Stephens merger, has foresworn competing for FTSE 350 audits. And as put by BDO UK’s chief on December 14, “BDO was not looking to make itself grow to the scale of the Big Four …’.”

As put more bluntly in the CMA submission of Serco PLC:

“The mid-tier firms do not possess the capability nor experience to undertake complex, international audits.… There is an important role for mid-tier firms to play but it is not the audit of complex, international companies.”

Nor do they have an alternative supply of talent, as poaching in volume from the Big Four will not happen. The collapse of Arthur Andersen in 2002 taught that restive senior personnel have alternatives to remaining on the bull’s-eye of private practice, from which they fled in large numbers. And in any event, critics could scarcely welcome a market re-shaped by migration of alumni from the Big Four whose performance they so roundly excoriate, only to re-emerge in the smaller firms.

As for a newly authorized version of the National Audit Office (here, for short, “NNOA”) to audit the country’s financial sector, there is a glaring list of disabilities – here to note only three:

First, referring back to previously-cited Barclays Bank, some two-thirds of its revenue is derived internationally. An NNAO would be obliged to rely on Big Four firms for help outside the UK, there being no alternate sources – non-UK firms unwilling to be subordinated to a foreign bureaucracy for politicized supervision and liability.

At the same time, while the Labour report criticizes the Big Four’s supervision and control of their international networks (see p. 64), a NNAO itself would be no more able to spot or prevent a remote rogue trader, the likes of Nick Leeson in the Singapore office of Barings.

Second, what of the UK operations of financial institutions headquartered elsewhere? Of the world’s twenty largest investment banks, only Barclays and HSBC are based in the UK, where they compete with such formidable multi-nationals as JPMorgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, Citgroup, Credit Suisse and Deutsche Bank.

Given their percentage of the UK sector, the mission of a credible NNOA would be undercut by leaving those audits status quo in the hands of the Big Four. But if it did attempt to audit their UK operations, could it expect its work to be accepted globally by the banks themselves, their ex-UK auditors from the Big Four, their own principal regulators, or globally-oriented investors?

Third, in any event, the UK banks are subject to extensive ex-UK oversight and regulation. For example, Barclays and HSBC with their securities listed in the US must be audit-compliant with the rules of both the SEC and the PCAOB.

That means that an NNAO would have to register and submit itself to the inspection process of the PCAOB. Its performance would be subject to liability under the American securities laws, on a “joint and several” basis for any performance shortcoming, and with no SEC-permissible cap or limitation.

It is for the political scientists to reconcile these real-world exposures with Labour’s antipathy toward foreign entanglements and diminished British sovereignty, as on display in the Brexit debates. But with the billions in fines paid by non-US banks growing out of the financial crises of 2007-2008, and the current overhang of the FDIC’s judgment for $ 635 million against PwC over its audits of Colonial Bank, a British civil servant would be brave indeed to serve as signing partner for an NNAO audit of a UK-based bank.  

 

Further detail would only be-labour these issues or the many others in the shadow government’s report, when there are more pressing concerns. For now, thanks for joining this discussion. Please share with friends and colleagues. Comments are invited and welcome, and subscription sign-up is easy and free – both at the Main page.