"Everything old is new again ...."
-- Peter Allen
To pull off the next large accounting scam – or, more virtuously, to try to prevent it – where would we look?
This always-pertinent question has global dimensions, with criminal charges now lodged against two Price Waterhouse partners in India – see here – for their alleged complicity in the fraud perpetrated at Satyam Computer Services Ltd. under the leadership of CEO Ramalinga Raju.
Those inclined to heed memory and history as guides for the future will find familiar the recited bad deeds by which the Satyam accused are now answerable to the Indian courts:
- Bogus invoices for customer work never performed lay at the heart of the mid-‘80’s house of cards known as ZZZZ Best.
- Inflated rolls of non-existent employees echo the ledgers of fictitious insureds a decade earlier at Los Angeles-based Equity Funding.
- Shadow businesses and opaque investments recall the undrillable pools of petroleum, said to lie deep under the Canadian Arctic, sold as snake oil in the 1960’s by Bernie Cornfeld in the original version of Fund of Funds.
In a world of borderless impacts, and with the certainty that details of the Satyam criminal file will now implicate the defensibility of the investor lawsuits lodged in the United States as well as in India, it’s well to ask what new risks lie over the next hill.
Especially since, as similarly structured schemes have kept recurring with dreary regularity, decade after decade, the learning capacity of the financial gate-keepers is slight enough in fighting the last war, let alone to anticipate or prevent the next.
A starting point will be the predictable re-emergence of another rogue trader – almost routinely expected if still highly impactful – the next generation’s reincarnation of Nick Leeson at Barings or Yasuo Hamanaka at Sumitomo or Jerôme Kerviel at Société Générale.
But it’s also back to basics, in a world said to be reverting to older styles of banking and finance. In the recent era of exotic financial derivatives and black-box valuation models, the pervasive separation of deal-doing incentives from underlying transaction risks prove illusory and ultimately disastrous. Looking ahead, it can be anticipated that the next generation of white-collar schemers will unsheathe the simpler tools that have served so effectively throughout the past to entice the investors and evade the auditors.
Old memories may still spark, for example, to recall the 1960’s tanks full of “vegetable oil” in the meadows of New Jersey: collateral for the negotiable warehouse receipts issued by American Express, but actually nothing but water – a scheme that succeeded because the auditors looked from the top of the tanks at the thin layer of oil on the surface, rather than taking taps from the bottom.
Or the herds of ghost cattle, sold in fractional interests to urban investors: the livestock numbers were inflated by repeatedly cycling the same calves through the counting chutes – under the noses of the city-based audit staff who failed to prevent double-counting by the simple control of a chalk-stick mark on the forehead of each animal as it passed by.
Or the heavy-duty oil-field trucks comprising salable equipment portfolios: sensibly counted as they were scheduled through their repair and maintenance depots -- except that each one slipped past the auditors multiple times by the simple expedient of driving behind the repair shed to swap the identifying bar code on its engine block.
Or – to tie off a list that could otherwise go on a while – the allocation to investors of interests in a giant hill of Latin American coffee beans: except that under a thin layer of the real thing, the mound consisted of sand and bales of hay – undetected by the auditors too fastidious or pressed for time to drill or dig deeply enough to the core to get a legitimate sample.
All real stories – none of them all that original. But any of them will likely show up again soon, as timeless devices used to inflate the performance of money-gathering institutions basing their business on asset-based transactions.
Let the gate-keepers be warned – and the future perpetrators too. But only if the lessons of the past are learnable.
Drop me a note if you have a candidate for an industry or a practice having special exposure. As a teaser -- I will soon take a specific look at a particular sector where I would see this aspect of risk to be both newly emergent and especially acute.
And thanks for joining this dialog. Please share with your friends and colleagues. And if not a subscriber, you are invited to sign on at the Home page – easy, free and non-commercial.