The latest example of finger-pointing in the credit market turmoil is the examiner’s report placing blame for the bankruptcy of subprime mortgage lender New Century Financial upon its auditor, KPMG. Released yesterday, and available here, the report echoes the drubbing that fell upon Andersen over Enron – a no-win subject for the auditors: “By which are you more corrupted – your breadth of client relationships, or your fee levels in general?”
Public discussion is finally beginning to focus on the reality that the familiar model for auditor assurance on large-company financial statements is flawed to the point of requiring fundamental re-structuring. Especially in the absence of coherent and achievable solutions, however, one element deserving attention is the obsolete and over-valued concept of auditor independence.
So this column, originally published in the International Herald Tribune on March 24, 2006, retains its relevance.
Setting Free the Auditors
The American writer Dorothy Parker, who never shied from afflicting the comfortable, put it this way: "If you can't say something nice, come over and sit by me."
Parker would have been aghast at the self-congratulatory atmosphere among the regulators of the world's securities markets. According to them, the problem of dubious corporate accounting has been solved by strictly limiting the kinds of services the auditors can provide to clients.
There is nothing more sacred in auditor-client literature than the notion of auditor independence, which dates from the founding of the profession in the 19th century.
Yet with auditors today stumbling under the weight of litigation - each of the surviving Big Four accounting firms having a list of cases large enough to be fatal - this unexamined burden has become yet another millstone. And a proposed solution circulating in the halls of Washington - involving a waiver of the Sarbanes- Oxley rules limiting the scope of auditor services to clients - is a political nonstarter.
So I say it is time to stop making nice and to discard a 150-year-old piece of conventional wisdom. The concept of auditor independence does not serve the interests of investors.
Audit performance - and more immediately, the survival of the large firms to serve their global clients and the capital markets - would be better achieved if the current independence requirements and constraints were scrapped altogether.
Auditors should be free to provide their clients with any services within their skills. The only thing that should be required is comprehensive disclosure of all relationships, to be evaluated and decided by the voting power of the marketplace.
Some will be scandalized by the suggestion that the sacred cow of auditor independence should be led off and humanely put out of its misery. But there's a reason it should be done.
Regulators confess to being clueless about what will happen when the next of the Big Four accounting networks disintegrates under the combined pressures of hostile law enforcement and overwhelming shareholder litigation. (Think it can't happen? After Enron and Arthur Andersen - and the $456 million fine over questionable tax shelters paid by KPMG to escape indictment? It's Russian roulette out there, and the gun is full of bullets.)
The purest argument for driving the profession back to audit-only basics has always been that as clients pay the fees, for services of any type, auditor independence is inevitably subject to compromise.
But to finish that thought, in a system so inherently subject to corruption, auditors should never take any fees from their clients. So who will pay? Inserting a government-run fee and license structure amounts to nationalizing the audit function - an idea that figures nowhere in rational dialogue. And there are no other volunteers around.
Likewise, the argument that consulting fees corrupted auditor behavior was always a bit stretched. Heady as that stream of revenue was, it was the money itself, not the source. It could be said, in fact, that auditors who depend on audit fees alone are under even more pressure to accommodate client wishes. And whenever that accommodation has turned ugly - Andersen's travails with Enron being only the most egregious example - it's the firms that pay. As recent history shows, they have neither the reputation nor the capital to bear the terrible cost.
Clearly, the accountants garner neither respect nor liability protection by complying with these enforced codes of independence. They, and their clients, would deliver better value if audits were based on a comprehensive understanding of and involvement with the business. In other words, auditors need to be closer to their clients, not farther away.
Who better to ensure that financial statements are free of error than a professional who designs, installs, operates and maintains the system that accounts for the transactions of an enterprise - the very services from which today's auditors are barred?
This does not dismiss the importance of accountability or of oversight. Regulators have their place - but only under systems of liability that address the reality of today's deadly threats.