Re:Balance -- Jim Peterson

KPMG's Independence, Herbalife's Stock Price, and the Game of Name Blame

What does this say about the value placed by investors on the independence of outside auditors: 

Two trading days after KPMG withdrew its audit reports on the financial statements of its Los Angeles clients Herbalife and Skechers, because of inside information shared by its promptly sacked and criminally charged engagement partner Scott London, the stock price of both of those stocks has actually risen!

The consequences of London’s passing on, to the million-dollar benefit of his golfing pal Bryan Shaw, will be swift and nasty:

• Ratted out by Shaw, London will cut the fastest plea deal the prosecutors will offer.

• KPMG will hurl its checkbook at every dollar of costs incurred by its ex-clients to obtain replacement auditors.

• Aggressive plaintiffs’ lawyers will fashion some theory of shareholder harm – despite the stock price upticks – doubtless spinning a conspiratorial connection with the long-running spat over Herbalife between raider Carl Icahn and shortseller Bill Ackman, and eventually coercing a nuisance-level settlement.

• And the American securities and accountancy regulators – the SEC and the PCAOB – will vie with each other in a pell-mell rush, recalling the unseemly post-Enron haste with which the Sarbanes-Oxley law was passed in 2002, to push a requirement that auditors of US public companies identify by name their partners signing client audit reports.

This last has been opposed with intensity by the American accounting profession, although long in place in much of the world without measurable adverse effects.   

Nor, it should be noted, with measurable benefits either – as client managements and audit committees in the US have never lacked access to the decision-qualifying information necessary about the engagement personnel at their audit firms.

In the wishful search for magic bullets aimed at the structural weaknesses in the auditor-client business model, “partner naming” is a distinctly small-bore and ineffective weapon. 

But London’s downfall does require re-framing my opening question, this way, heretical as it may seem:

What value to the operation of the capital markets – if any -- is actually delivered by the entire structure of auditor independence? 

London’s professional position was destroyed, and his liberty put in jeopardy, not because he violated the elaborate dictates of the auditor independence rules, but because of his multi-year violations of the insider-trading prohibitions of the American securities laws.

And on the other hand, despite KPMG’s immediate and apologetic resignation and report withdrawals, the stock market has given credence to the assertions that the substantive content of the Herbalife and Skechers financial statements are unaffected (even given the charges hurled in the Icahn/Ackman dust-up).

In short, the indifference of equity investors to the state of KPMG’s independence speaks volumes.

I’ve long been saying (here and here) that – under the “client pays” business model for financial statement assurance, invented back in the Victorian era – the accounting profession has gained nothing positive for years, by way of reputation, stature or risk and exposure mitigation, from the intellectually unsatisfactory edifice of “appearance of independence.”

Now, the stock price non-event of Scott London’s misadventures equally shows the converse – that investors impose no downside price penalty on even a slam-dunk independence violation.

Conclusion: the time, energy and cost of maintaining the outmoded and anachronistic structure of “independence” should be re-directed to the long roster of topics legitimately worthy of the effort.

 

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Re:Balance Takes a Spring Time-Out -- Will the Silliness Please Take a Break Too!

For the first time since launching as a blog in 2008 after its run without a break from 2002 as “Balance Sheet” in the business section of the International Herald Tribune – “Re:Balance” is going to be dark for several weeks. 

Intense and nearly unbroken travel on three continents will impede staying current on all the mischief within the capabilities of the inter-locking participants in the structure by which assurance is provided on the financial statements of the world’s large companies: issuers, the large accounting networks themselves, users in the capital and investment markets, agencies of law enforcement and politicians and regulators.

Developments in this troubled world are likely to be consequential but cannot be predicted with any level of confidence – so there will be catching up late in the spring.

Three items in the last week head the list of topics to be monitored, however:

• The PCAOB announced consideration of a proposal for the reorganization of its auditing standards – something on absolutely nobody’s list of priorities -- while the agency has failed to get off the snide on either auditor rotation or the content of the auditor’s report – reinforcing the unavoidable conclusion that this body has lapsed into terminal inconsequence. 

• The vote of the European Parliament’s Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee to scrap a proposed requirement for mandatory auditor rotation, in favor of a less binding “directive” on periodic re-tendering, has potential to inflict a dose of reason and reality on a topic long threatening to float away on clouds of fantasy. 

• And the news from the UK -- that the move by Schroders to replace long-time auditor PwC with KPMG has foundered on the inability of the putative successor to satisfy the independence requirements -- provides early validation that even aspirations limited to periodic re-tendering are subject to the realities of a market for audit services too constrained to function under legislated mandates.

All of these challenges reinforce the over-arching need for fundamental re-engineering of the reporting and audit functions in their entirety. But this process is unlikely to advance in any significant way during my brief absence. 

Instead, there is every reason to be confident that these problems will all be here and awaiting attention when I return.

 

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The PCAOB’s Inspection Reports Nibble at PwC -- A Reader Asks, “Where’s the Beef?”

Food beyond compare

Food beyond belief

Mix it in a mincer

And pretend it's beef

Kidney of a horse

Liver of a cat

Filling up the sausages

With this and that

-- Thénardier, “Master of the House,” Les Misérables

The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board – overseer of the accounting profession in the United States – got in a snit recently, perceiving that PwC was lax in its efforts to remediate the “significant audit performance deficiencies” that the agency asserted in its 2008 and 2009 inspection reports.

Expressing pique as it only could, on March 7, the PCAOB released to an indifferent public the previously undisclosed “Part II” portions of those reports.

Did it arouse the aforesaid public to care? Or even to notice?

A predictable handful of the large accounting firms’ most reliably ardent critics did weigh in (here and here).

Meanwhile a measured comparison comes to mind – the teapot-scale tempest aroused in Britain and Ireland this winter, over the discovery of equine DNA in samples of meatballs and ravioli – not, enforcers emphasized, because of any actual consumer health hazard, but over alleged deficiencies in labeling and transparency.

On which my perspective takes from the attitude of my daughter, a situational vegetarian who, on assignment this last year in Southeast Asia, has extended her palate and appetite to include crickets, dog conch and scorpion.

In the European kerfuffle, a libertarian-oriented omnivore – believing in both cultural differences and regulatory intervention only to the minimum necessary – would favor a simple modified label: “May contain horsemeat”. 

As for the PCAOB, the question has to be asked -- How can an oversight function claim either legitimacy or effectiveness, that:

• Decides for itself how to define and identify not a legal or professional standards failure, but an elusive “significant audit performance deficiency.”

• Keeps score under its own methods and incentives, like a traffic meter maid sent on patrol with a book of tickets and a daily quota.

• Must under cover of confidentiality conceal both the names and the detailed particulars of its self-defined offenses.

• And then in a burst of ill-temper, decides for itself whether the undisclosed substance of a remedial effort is satisfactory within unmeasured and unarticulated standards.

It’s no wonder, for two reasons, that PwC saw no reason to pursue its right of appeal to the Securities and Exchange Commission.

First, because PwC negotiated the ability to append to the PCAOB’s release a pronouncement of its commitment to virtuous conduct, positively radiant with unctuous platitudes.

But second and more especially, because under the current model for compliance with the securities laws, under which there is no available alternative, the Big Four-dominated market for large-company audit services is armor-plated against the PCAOB’s pop-gun arsenal. 

Law enforcement, rules compliance and social norm-setting in general -- in contexts that are controversial, subjective and incomprehensible to the laity -- are subject to credibility challenges and diminution of the authority of their arbiters:

• The Supreme Court’s obscure definition of obscenity, “I know it when I see it” (Stewart, J., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 1964).

• The theological search for distinctions between mortal and venial sins.

• The nuances and complexity of sport, from soccer’s off-side and cricket’s leg-before-wicket to hockey’s high-sticking and baseball’s rules on balks and infield flies.

• The subtleties of line-drawing between shrewd and informed investing and insider trading, or the bribery of officials and accepted business facilitation.

Here -- the mutual hypocrisy in the whole sorry audit regulatory environment is pervasive:

The PCAOB gets to pretend it is engaged in a meaningful exercise, worthy of being taken seriously in the capital marketplace.

The audit firms are obliged to pretend that they take the cost and impositions of the inspection process as something more than the de facto license fee paid as a nuisance to maintain their franchise.

And to the limited extent they really care, financial statement users can only search elsewhere for meaningful assurance, beyond the model unchanged since the Victorian era and long since degraded into obsolescence. 

Critics of this dysfunctional structure are entitled to their finger-pointing cynicism. But their bile is misplaced – until and unless they unite in advocating an achievable effort to re-engineer the entire system of reporting and assurance that today only fosters ambiguity, inconsequence and disrespect.

Until which, at the foot of each PCAOB inspection report should be appended an adapted version of the suggested European meat label – “May contain horse-sh*t.”

 

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Re-Structuring the Audit Profession: The UK's Competition Commission Hunts the Woozle

 After the United Kingdom’s Competition Commission issued its report on February 22, asserting that the Big-Four-dominated audit services market is non-competitive, I sought to raise a flag of warning that, unless de-railed, its rush to fait accompli would soon inflict mandatory auditor rotation or at least re-tender on global-scale companies.

Diligent digging through the Commission’s augean piles of paperwork makes clear that its ostensibly supportive “research” ranges from the shallow and irrelevant to a results-driven reflection of its confirmation bias.

Comes to mind A.A. Milne’s 1926 fable of Winnie-the-Pooh and his pal Piglet, earnest and naïve, circling their own tracks around a spinney of larch-trees, and befuddled in their speculation that they might be tracking a Woozle.

 

Despite a forthright bias in favor of “auditor switching” – reflected in the finding that “incumbent auditors … face less competition for their ongoing engagements than they would were the company more willing to switch thereby reducing rivalry” -- the Commission fails to elicit any evidence-based impact of auditor tenure on audit quality.

To be sure, the Commission’s inquiry into the rate of “switching” is voluminous – building elaborate calculations in search of relationships among such elements as client size, audit complexity, geographic spread, client evolution from private to listed status, length of tenure at the start of the measured period, etc.

Yet, it does not attempt to examine, much less resolve, these two related but distinct questions:

• With the considerable number of long-tenured auditor-client relationships where the record of non-controversial financial reporting is unbroken, is there any identifiable relationship between the length of auditor tenure and the incidence of diminished quality or “audit failure”?

• As to the extremely small population of actual “audit failures” – compared to the huge number of non-problematic audits – is there any identifiable relationship between the length of auditor tenure and such failures themselves?

Nor is the integrity of the Commission’s history of the profession any better than that of their economic research. Their lengthy discussion of the early audit requirements, evolving from the Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 through to the superseding Act of 1856, omits essential facts:

• First, the terms of the 1844 Act were met by “auditors” chosen from among the company shareholders – non-professional co-investors engaged to examine and report on their company’s results, with interests not independent but precisely aligned economically with their fellows. 

• Second, it was not until the dawn of the next decade that these amateur “auditors” reached out to the nascent profession for assistance – e.g., William Welch Deloitte, then aged 32, joined Messrs. John Dickinson and Richard Atkinson, the shareholder auditors of the Great Western Railway’s accounts for the six months ended December 31, 1849, in the terse opinion dated February 8, 1850 – “Audited and Approved.”

• Third, therefore, by the Act of 1856, developments in the market for independent audit had surged forward, making that legislation essentially reactive, in the same manner as today for government regulators typically late to the party. 

Shortcomings in the Commission’s approach include a rose-tinted survey of the mid-tier firms’ “self appraisals of their capability and willingness to audit FTSE 350 companies” – noting, however, that as of 2010, the Big Four audited 99 companies of the FTSE 100, and 96% by number and 99% by fees of the entire FTSE 350.

In that context, asking a mid-tier business developer about his firm’s capability to audit a global-scale FTSE 100 enterprise would be like asking a sophomore in a fraternity house how he’d like a date with the Sports Illustrated swimsuit cover model. What possible response could be expected?

My graduate-level course in Risk Management uses a reading exercise in what legitimate, non-ideological research ought to look like – drawn from the very Victorian era when independent audit was invented, on whose history the Commission is so dim.

It’s the 1855 diary of physician John Snow, whose meticulous tracking of epidemic cholera cases around the publicly-accessible water pump at Broad Street in central London ranks among the origins of forensic medicine.

Dr. Snow’s techniques made inquiry in both directions: Not only who got sick, after drinking water from the pump – including both residents and casual visitors to the neighborhood. But also, who lived and worked in the vicinity and yet stayed well – such as brewery workers who preferred their own product to pump water, and factory hands in a facility with a separate and independent well.

By so doing, Snow avoided precisely the trap of disregarding the “absent evidence,” into which the Commission’s ends-serving inquiry falls headlong.

Confronted by Christopher Robin’s challenge that they had been chasing their own footsteps, rather than the imaginary Woozle, Pooh had the grace to concede:

"‘I see now,’ said Winnie-the-Pooh.

‘I have been Foolish and Deluded,’ said he, ‘and I am a Bear of No Brain at All.’

…. And then he brightened up suddenly.

‘Anyhow,’ he said, ‘it is nearly Luncheon Time.’

So he went home for it." 

 

Commission group chairman Laura Carstensen and her fellows should do no less.

 

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Mandatory Auditor Rotation: The UK's Competition Commission Stirs the Pot

For a charm of powerful trouble,

Like a hell-broth boil and bubble.

Double, double toil and trouble;

Fire burn, and caldron bubble.

            W. Shakespeare, “MacBeth,” 4.1

The simmering caldron of accountancy regulation was brought to a rolling boil in the United Kingdom on February 22, when the five-strong Audit Investigation Group of the Competition Commission issued its provisional findings.

No less sweeping than its assertion that the supply of statutory audit services to large public companies is rife with adverse effects on competition, the Group's suggested “remedies” would be draconian – among them, mandatory re-tendering for audit engagements every five to seven years, and mandatory rotation of audit firms after seven to fourteen years.

Remarkably, while the UK press treated these landscape-altering proposals as a one-day story (e.g., the Financial Times, BBC and Independent), attention in America beyond minor pick-up from the news services has included not the first word of either reporting or commentary.

Which had better change, and quickly too – not just because the basic impracticality of mandatory rotation is a long-standing barrier to its implementation (here, here and here). It’s because Group Chairman Laura Carstensen and her coven of non-accountants are working to the accelerated timetable of March 21 for comments, and publication of a final report by October 20 of this year.

By then, under the typical regulators’ effects of both momentum and inertia, their “provisional” hell-broth is likely to be fully cooked.

And a toxic brew it is indeed.

The Group did give the market-dominating Big Four tetrapoly a back-handed compliment, by exonerating them from the most malign charges of the profession’s fiercest critics:

“The CC also considered whether the market conditions are conducive to coordination or that Big 4 firms engage in tacit collusion; that they bundle audit and non-audit services together in order to raise barriers to expansion to other firms; that they target the customers of Mid Tier firms with particularly low prices; or that they are able to exercise undue influence over the formation of regulation or on regulatory bodies through their extensive alumni networks. To date, the CC has not identified sufficient evidence to support these other theories of harm.”

Scant comfort, indeed, as they went on to “find” an entire menu of ostensible reasons for a dramatic re-structuring of the audit services market:

            “Companies face significant hurdles in comparing the offerings of an incumbent auditor with those of alternative suppliers other than through a tender process.

            “It is difficult for companies to judge audit quality in advance due to the nature of audit.

            “Companies and firms invest in a relationship of mutual trust and confidence from which neither will lightly walk away as this means the loss of the benefits of continuity stemming from the relationship.

            “Company management face significant opportunity costs in the management time involved in the selection and education of a new auditor.

            “Mid Tier firms face experience and reputational barriers to expansion and selection in the FTSE 350 audit market.

            “Auditors have misaligned incentives, as between shareholders and company management, and so compete to satisfy management rather than shareholder demand, where the demands of executive management and shareholders differ.

              “Auditors face barriers to the provision of information that shareholders demand (in particular, from the reluctance of company management to permit further disclosure)."

Beyond these mostly unexceptional characteristics of a properly-functioning market for specialized professional services, of course, the unresolved and gaping logical gap in the Group’s entire approach is two-fold:

• First, Big Four dominance of large-company audit is a natural-market result of client demands for scale in geographic coverage, expertise and exposure tolerance – all of which are beyond the capabilities of the smaller firms.
• Second, at the same time, the widely-shared dissatisfaction of the user community -- that the standard and commoditized auditor’s report is grievously obsolete and provides no value -- is destined to be unrealized by the attempted re-engineering initiatives of such standard-setters as the PCAOB or the IAASB.

Nor is either of these root difficulties touched at all by the asserted but unsubstantiated claims of benefit to audit quality to be wrought by mandatory tendering or rotation.

Instead, within what the FT described last fall as the Commission’s “sheaves of working papers,” there is not a single research under-taking, much less a scintilla of evidence, showing an actual link between the length of an auditor’s tenure and the quality of either its audit work or its client’s financial reporting.   

Put in summary, the fundamental dysfunctionalities in the reporting and assurance models are untouchable by the “solutions” urged by those having the authority (if not the evidentiary basis) for their mischief-making, while mandatory re-tendering and rotation remain as “remedies” in search of problems yet to be grounded in reality.

But if not stopped, the Competition Commission is likely to work its will.

A regulator on a results-oriented mission is dangerous enough. But undiluted by the flavoring effects of the facts, the Commission’s recipe for a reconstituted audit structure will leave a foul taste all around.

Those obliged to sup at this devil’s banquet are advised to bring very long-handled spoons.

 

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Standard & Poor's in the Gunsights: High Noon at the Triple-A Corral

The United States Justice Department filed a five billion dollar lawsuit on February 3 against credit-ratings agency Standard & Poor’s, over its ratings of mortgage-backed collateralized debt obligations lying at the heart of the last decade’s financial crisis (see here and here). 

Settlement talks had broken down, over S&P’s reluctance to admit to fraud charges. But the wager here is not the over/under on S&P’s eventual and inevitable settlement. Before that, there will be much posturing and a long way to run.

For sure, McGraw-Hill subsidiary S&P has lawyered up for the battle, adding to its team the trial capability of über-barrister John Keker – advocate for such luminaries of civic virtue as Enron’s Andy Fastow, Credit Suisse’s Frank Quattrone, Lance Armstrong, Eldridge Cleaver and de-frocked king of the securities class action bar Bill Lerach. 

Of concern, rather, is the longer-term impact on the roles, relationships and exposures of the various gate-keepers, ambiguously deemed critical by society to the global capital markets.

The New York Times’s Floyd Norris scratched the surface of this issue – here – but beneath lies much more.

Consider this menu of common attributes:

• A standard, commoditized report, without which financial products cannot be brought to the investor market.

• Providers not engaged by or in direct contact with investors, but competing to be engaged and paid directly by the issuers.

• Despite which, elaborate assertions of “independence” – widely criticized as resting on the intellectually shaky platform of “appearance.”

• Severely constrained choice among providers to large issuers, from a number of players limited to the low single-digits.

• Barriers to new competitive entry based on market demands for global scale, competence and resources – although tightly regulated, the provider cartel is not constrained by limits on government licenses or other franchise restrictions.

• Claims that, broadly speaking, the reports reasonably reflect reality, most of the time – except under highly stressed conditions, when they do not – a position not unlike the claim that the Boeing 787’s lithium-ion batteries work reasonably well, most of the time -- except when they catch fire.

• Provider claims to have adjusted and improved methodologies and process in light of recent criticisms – proclamations echoing those of my college era, before political correctness, that “Vassar girls don’t do those things -- and besides, the grass was wet.”

• Finally, the standard document noted at the head of this list, explicitly couched in the language of an “opinion” – as if, despite the construction of an elaborate and expensive pyramid of supportive analysis and procedures, the result were intended as a Zagats review or a “like” on Facebook.

Up to the last, this list of attributes would apply equally to the three dominant ratings agencies – S&P, Moody’s and Fitch – as to the accounting tetrapoly of Deloitte, E&Y, KPMG and PwC.

Except for the dissonance at the expectations gap, where the global accounting networks face existential litigation exposure for each large-company audit report they sign, while the ratings agencies have – until now – successfully wrapped themselves in the armored blanket of the First Amendment.

Does the government’s suit against S&P portend a realignment of the exposure realities? S&P’s free-speech advocate Floyd Abrams has forsworn a First Amendment defense (here), so a new era of litigation risk may confront S&P as well as its brethren.

From the audit firms’ perspective, though, any temptation to schadenfreude is hazardous – because of the speed and vigor with which the slightly guilty pleasure taken at another’s misfortune can turn to ashes.

Especially if there should be a contagion effect.

 

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Auditor Liability for the Dixon Fraud - Scape-Goat Hunting in the Courthouse

A nightmare of auditor litigation was predictable, when the news broke last May that the comptroller of bucolic Dixon, Illinois, had helped herself to $ 53 million dollars of city funds (here). 

Having financed her luxury-level hobby horses on an apparently modest five-figure city salary, revealed as supplanted by twenty years of hand-over-fist embezzlement, Rita Crundwell now faces twenty years of federal prison time (here).

As of December, the town added Midwestern regional accounting firm CliftonLarsonAllen as a litigation target (here) – liability being asserted for its multiple roles including Crundwell’s own tax return preparer and keeper of the city ledger, as well as auditor of the town’s financial statements until 2006 when it dialed back to “compilation services.”

A full-out courtroom scuffle would be interesting. On the one hand, the accountability of Dixon’s own city fathers over the extended looting of an annual budget of only $ 8 to $ 9 million implicates their guardianship of the municipal barn door through which Crundwell cantered away with her bags of stolen loot.

But as I wrote at the time: 

“The accounting profession, mistakenly relying on disclosure of the limits on what a compilation report does or does not say, has traditionally looked on (compilation) work as low risk – which it mostly is. But consider the environment, and the typical level and quality of competence, governance and integrity in municipal government. What level of confidence should with safety be routinely reposed in those entrusted with management of a small city’s financial resources?” 

  On the recent reporting, the Clifton firm’s reliance on the limited duties associated with a compilation is exposed to collateral arguments about its deeper involvement: emails continuing to refer to “audits,” alleged working-paper support to the local sole practitioner putting his name to the opinions, and maintenance of a steady-to-increasing stream of fees even with the reduction in its stated scope of responsibilities. 

Limited as compilation work requirements may be, they continue to require fulfillment of professional standards of quality control, ethical principles of integrity, objectivity competence and due care.

And by way of reinforcement, commentators and standard-setters continue to press the importance of skepticism in oversight (here and here) – difficult enough to achieve, and hostage to fortune whenever tested under the harsh glare of hindsight.

However -- those expecting a shoot-out at the Dixon corral should prepare for a damp squib instead -- mainly because the prospect of an actual trial rather than an out-of-court settlement is so slight.

That’s because the Clifton firm’s exposure is life-threatening, and so unlikely to be tested in a trial.

Which is despite the fact that Dixon’s outside lawyers hold themselves out as personal injury lawyers, who do not publicize accountancy litigation as a practice area. So they are unconstrained outsiders to the culture of the traditional accountancy plaintiffs’ bar, which has long calibrated its high-end demands so as to wring only enough from the flock of Big Firm geese to enrich themselves while sustaining the steady supply of golden eggs.

Instead, using the model on which I have previously explored the shockingly small size of a litigation threat that would disintegrate a global-scale accounting firm (here), the Clifton firm’s reported $ 570 million of annual revenue is a fragile base from which to defend against a worst-case impact on the order of $ 53 million. [1]  

No management has the fortitude, much less the confidence – except under the most extreme duress -- willingly to submit the quality of its work to a civil jury for such a price.

Existential threats from litigation are an unconfronted daily reality for the Big Four firms (here). But no less for their smaller brethren, where the threat is on a “one-and-done” basis. BDO’s ability to withstand the adverse jury verdict in the Bankest case in Florida was a fortuitous combination of persistence, favorable court rulings and an eventual settlement – still not publicly disclosed (here and here). And the Baker Tilly firm’s $ 50 adverse verdict in Wisconsin in the Aqua Finance matter – unhappily including a coverage dispute with its insurance carrier (here) – surpasses its resources on a worst-case basis as well.

None of which bodes well for the strength, sustainability or long-term future of the assurance function – professed to be important to society’s ability to rely on audited financial statements.

Instead, the clock of doom ticks toward midnight.

 

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---

[1] Write me for the details if interested. My pencil pushing suggests a break point of around $ 50 million, but precision is impossible. Insurance coverage and deductibles have relevance, but only as a measure of the pain that might be inflicted on future generations of Clifton partners.

Re-Posting: Foreign Auditor Inspections? "China Syndrome" Strikes the SEC

Confidence in the American securities and accountancy regulators was not raised, when a press release on December 3 announced -- under the headline “SEC Charges China Affiliates of Big Four Accounting Firms …In Refusing to Produce Documents” – a proceeding against the five largest global networks.

For the first time in its eleven-year history, this column calls upon a graphic to illustrate the folly of a gang that couldn’t count straight -- here.

The PCAOB has been stymied for a decade in its futile attempts to enforce in China its asserted mandate under Sarbanes/Oxley to inspect and obtain working papers from auditors, including those in foreign countries, which audit more than twenty percent of a registrant’s assets or revenue (here and here). And the SEC itself has been piddling along with company-specific subpoena enforcement and administrative proceedings against Deloitte and its Shanghai affiliate.

So now they have called in the heavy artillery, in the person of Robert Khuzami, director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, who says that non-complying firms “face serious sanctions.”

Khuzami cannot be faulted for zealotry. He arrived on the scene of an agency whose Cox-era somnolence had missed not only Bernie Madoff’s predations on the domestic front but the internationally destructive tsunami of “reverse mergers” by which Chinese companies gained access to the world’s capital markets. That scorecard, a decade late and billions short, now includes more than 50 de-listings by the SEC and 40 fraud actions – and, elsewhere, a flurry of civil litigations, and most recently an agreement by Ernst & Young to settle civil litigation (but not a disciplinary proceeding) relating to Sino-Forest, by agreeing to pay C$ 117 million, the largest auditor settlement in Canadian history.

(As an aside, those disposed to see darkly conspiratorial revolving doors in the place of Chinese fire drills will note that this is the same Khuzami whose predecessor at SEC Enforcement from 1998 to 2001, Richard Walker, thereafter went in-house at Deutsche Bank, where he hired Khuzami in 2002. So the latter, before becoming the top American securities cop in 2009, was on-scene at DB when the bank – as now reported – according to three whistle-blowers concealed losses of up to $ 12 billion for failure to “mark-to-market” the exposure gap on a notional $ 130 billion of exotic derivatives known as “leveraged super-seniors.”)

Calling in Khuzami’s troops may look like the last act of desperate regulators – but it will actually play as the next act in “The Comedy of Errors.”

That’s not because it’s so little so late. Or because frustration of the PCAOB’s aspirations to access Chinese auditors and work papers would attract retaliation against their own ambitious plans to re-structure the global audit market by building and unleashing global-scale Chinese audit firms – an ambition otherwise unachievable both for want of competence in personnel and standards but also because, in reciprocal hostility, other countries will be no less protective of their local prerogatives.

It’s mainly that the US regulators’ only weapon of significance – banning Chinese affiliates of the large global accounting networks from qualifying to work on audits of American-listed companies – would ripple far beyond the toxic roster of China-based companies. There are potential consequences for global-scale companies with significant operations in China that go far beyond the inability of the PCAOB to inspect their local audit firms, whether or not maneuvered to keep below the 20% threshold.

Consider just two examples: Caterpillar, whose annual filing with the SEC does not set forth results by geography but discloses total 2011 sales of over $ 60 billion and elsewhere reports its China sales to be 3% of its total. Or HSBC, which does report by region including $ 3.6 billion in profits from China in 2011 and whose mainland Chinese operations include 133 outlets including 27 branches, even after the announced sale of its interest in giant insurer Ping An.

A barrier to the use of Chinese audit firms would make it impossible for those companies to include audited results from their Chinese operations in their global accounts. The result would be top-level consolidated financial statements with a huge unaudited portion, and auditors forced in their opinions to confront the professional standards for limitations on their audit scope.

Across the globe from KPMG in London and its top-level opinion on HSBC, to PwC in Peoria, Illinois for Caterpillar – unable to rely on their excommunicated Asian brethren – auditors would have no choice but to use the dread “qualify or disclaim” language -- never seen for a public company because anathema under the rules of the SEC itself. Or, in extremis, PCAOB de-registration of the whole of an audit network deemed non-compliant would render a company’s entire financial filing unacceptable.

Restoration of adult-level expectations and the pursuit of a non-litigated resolution process is essential, although a fading hope – since calling in the police as a last resort means an escalation of hostilities due to the one-dimensional DNA of their approach to problem-solving.

For good reason, then – under the latest blows from SEC Enforcement – the large accounting firms must feel like a bunch of nails in a hammer-testing factory.

 

My apologies for the re-posting, especially to subscription readers to whom the intended video clip did not feed -- a lesson learned in attempting to reach beyond competence with technology.

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HP-Autonomy: A Red-Ink Bath for Everyone

       “Either nobody in this deal understood the Company’s business, or someone was committing a fraud.”

-- Big Firm audit manager’s file note

Such language doubtless lurks in the working papers of the Big Four accounting firms, concerning this Thanksgiving’s biggest corporate turkey – HP’s announcement on November 20 of the whopping write-off of  $ 8.8 billion of the $ 11.1 billion paid a year earlier to acquire the UK’s FTSE 100 Autonomy.

How the blame-mongering cost of this fiasco will be allocated will depend, since each member of the large-firm tetrapoly touched the deal – Deloitte as Autonomy’s independent auditor, E&Y in the same role for HP, KPMG as part of HP’s huge buyer-side due diligence team, and finally PwC, brought in to pick over the forensic wreckage.

The quoted memo itself goes back a generation, to an investigation into sketchy high-tech revenue accounting – where it figured prominently in the investor litigation and the company’s SEC consent decree, an exhibit to the hazards of recording ideas that were both prescient and dangerous.     

That’s context for these thoughts responding to my investment banker friend and regular reader, “waiting for commentary on the Hewlett-Packard news and how it will affect Deloitte.”

Happily for the global supply of bandwidth, this story broke in a holiday week, absorbing in turkey, shopping and football the perfervid reactions of the most strident critics and their demonizing of the audit franchise as systemically venal and corrupt (e.g., here and here).

It is pointless now – time enough as the process evolves – to judge the predictable protestations of virtue of ex-CEO Mike Lynch, or Deloitte’s statement that it “categorically denies that it had any knowledge of any accounting misrepresentations….”

The Autonomy claims involve aggressions as old as IBM’s practices under the Watsons in the 1950’s – long stale and banal, and at best only interesting as an undergraduate classroom exercise in the endlessly elastic opportunities for revenue manipulation.

HP’s allegations do not, so far at least, involve such classics as the empty boxes at Miniscribe (1989) or Crazy Eddie (1987), nor yet the bogus contracts of Lernhout & Hauspie (2000) or Satyam (2009), but only the dreary familiarity of channel-stuffing and phantom contract dates – activities perpetually inviting to companies creatively striving for sweetened earnings, and elusively beyond the persistent efforts of standard-setters, regulators or law enforcement. 

More to the point, given the long-running criticism of Autonomy’s reporting by hedge funds and short sellers, is that it defies acceptable practice for HP CEO Meg Whitman to attempt the lay-off, that “the board relied on audited financials – audited by Deloitte – not Brand X accounting firm but Deloitte.”

Sorry, Meg. Not for a generation has an effective due diligence team done any more with a standard audit report than throw it onto the compost heap at the back of the document repository.

The HP team, said to comprise three hundred people from KPMG, bankers Perella Weinberg and Barclays and a quintet of law firms, surely had ample experience to sniff out any issues deemed significant. Why it did not will abide further finger-pointing.

But collective memories should not have been so short as to miss the red alert flag that the Autonomy deal was being flogged by Qatalyst Partners in the person of Frank Quattrone.

Whose earlier heady days in Silicon Valley had ended with one hung jury, a conviction reversed on appeal and a deferred prosecution agreement. So to say as did Reuters that Quattrone “specializes in tech deals” is like saying that Typhoid Mary was just going about innocently looking for work.  

Surer proof that HP will fail to spin its Autonomy debacle as an Enron-scale accounting fraud, is its assessment by Lynn Turner, who in 1998 was levitated to the post of Chief Accountant at the SEC from his position in a since-disappeared high tech company, after two decades at Coopers & Lybrand where he had emerged as national leader of its High Technology Practice.

Turner – whose background would presumably recognize dubious practices in the sector –- resisted the chance to pile on his erstwhile large-firm brethren --  for whom he forsook any affection upon his extraction from their ranks, his animosity more typically achieving the zeal of the mad monk in The DaVinci Code. Asking how the Autonomy policies “translate into a $ 5 billion write-off?” he demurred, that “the big issue isn’t the fraud they’re talking about. The big issue is that HP has made acquisitions that have turned out to be a disaster.”    

And so to my friend’s question, who might ultimately be liable to whom? The news is unhappy for HP’s long-suffering shareholders, whose claims -- either as a class (immediately launched) or on behalf of the company – under either British or American jurisprudence will offer little recourse, against HP or its management, Autonomy’s sellers or Deloitte.

Direct HP litigation against Deloitte would seem unlikely, given their existing ten-year consulting relationship as global alliance partners. Nor could Meg Whitman relish hostile courtroom scrutiny of the acquisition decision of her predecessor, Leo Apotheker, given – on her watch -- the year of pre-disclosure operating experience HP had with Autonomy, its string of prior write-offs including the $ 9.2 billion charge related to EDS, and the skeptics’ suspicion that HP’s write-off is a “big bath” overstatement of Autonomy’s illness to the forward benefit of HP’s balance sheet.   

If the impact on Deloitte and the other gate-keepers is likely “not much at all,” it is also likely not zero -- depending on where the “smoking gun” memos of the quoted variety might reside and be discovered – since a multi-billion dollar claim is beyond the Big Four firms’ financial capacity or risk tolerance to take to trial (here) – however enthusiastic their press-office protestations of innocence and scorched-earth defenses. 

What this latest dreary escapade does portend is several years of uncontrolled legal and litigation costs, and a flurry of inconclusive regulatory and oversight investigations – the end results of which will be inconsequential.

And finally, a wager is offered here, that Meg Whitman will not survive in place at HP to see it through.

 

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Ratings Agency Liability -- The Aussies Turn the World Upside Down

The litigation exposure of the Big Four accounting firms has not been made easier. 

The global networks should take no satisfaction from the field-leveling decision of Judge Jayne Jagot of the Federal Court of Australia, who on November 5 found ratings agency Standard & Poor’s (S&P) negligently liable to the purchasers of “grotesquely complicated” derivatives, designed and sold by ABN Amro. 

Schadenfreude would be wrong – and not just because it’s too hard to spell.

Consider the cries for accountability, during the recent years of financial calamity, by the auditors and the ratings agencies (e.g., here and here) – both of them, depending on one’s perspective, either vital gate-keepers to the markets, or aiders and abettors of the malefactors.

When their roles are compared, the guilty shiver of pleasure at another’s troubles would under-estimate the potential spreading of exposure. Consider the similarities: 

• Both have come to be viewed as essential functions in the world’s capital raising – chiefly by their regulatory authorities, to whom self-preservation and continuing existence are their own primary raison d’être.   

• Both are engaged and paid by their clients, upon which direct financial relationship they construct an elaborate edifice in illusory support of the intellectually unsatisfactory concept of an “appearance of independence.”

• Both seek to advance credible arguments that there is legitimate competition in their sector, despite effective barriers to entry that maintain their pass-the-parcel hegemony and an ever-tightening dominance by their respective global cartels.

• Their core products – the standard audit report and the three-letter rating – are delivered to users in prescribed and commoditized language – of which the source is a matter of consumer indifference and authorship would not be obvious absent a letterhead. 

• And finally, both couch their language in the qualified language of “opinions” and “judgment. ”

As to the last, however, the critical survivability difference emerges.

Namely, while S&P and its brethren have succeeded in wrapping themselves in the fuzzy if heretofore liability-proof blanket of the First Amendment’s free-speech protection, the auditors have long skirted disaster at the hands of a hindsight jurisprudence that threatens damages far beyond the limits of their financial tolerance or capacity. 

For the detail geeks, ABN Amro’s eye-crossingly complex derivatives, code-named “Rembrandt,” and the model-gaming involved in the rating process are laid out in overwhelming detail in the summary of Judge Jagot’s massive decision, and are thoroughly and colorfully discussed elsewhere – here and here.

The result threatens to turn topsy-turvy the ratings agencies’ comfortably protected world. Her Antipodean perspective is that S&P’s triple-A ratings were “misleading and deceptive,” involved “publication of information or statements false in material particulars,” and could not have been given by “a reasonably competent ratings agency.

For the ratings agencies themselves, the threat of worldwide contagion after the Rembrandt decision may be mitigated by both the availability of continuing scorched-earth defense strategies and the likely expiration of statutes of limitations to shield them from crisis-era claims.

For the auditors, who as noted are already far more exposed, it may be otherwise. Because -- taking cautionary note that the Rembrandt investor plaintiffs were supported by a publicly-listed company whose business is the funding and financing of large-scale class action securities litigation (here) – the investor-protection bar is a ruthlessly effective learning organism – to which the Judge’s liability language will operate like a blood-soaked invitation into a shark tank.

Even if not in the already-fraught American litigation market, should her process of hindsight negligence analysis gain traction in the courtrooms of Europe and elsewhere, the large accounting firms will find no ready firewall against the spreading conflagration.

 

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The Pre-Election Mood: Enervation Over Innovation

 I awoke last night in the cold sweat of nightmare terror – my own version of Bill Murray in the 1993 film, “Groundhog Day”-- that CNN moderator Candy Crowley saw her shadow, and we were cursed with six more weeks of Presidential debates.

And PCAOB chairman Jim Doty kept scheduling “public meetings” on the exhausted topic of mandatory auditor rotation – the last in Houston having dragged through October 18 with no observable contribution to our wisdom – until he held one in the junior high school gym in Punxsutawney itself.

A tour of media, commentators, and those knowledgeable, confirms the prevailing sense of lassitude and ennui – owing much to the nationwide American paralysis ahead of its November 6 elections, but also to the absence of any credible display of energy, much less urgency, around the issues overhanging the accounting profession.

The usual crabbing continues, of course – ranging from the ineffective if age-old grousing about auditor skepticism -- vented by the PCAOB chair himself, webinars from the private sector, and such bloggers as the Grumpy Old Accountants – to the commenter on my last posting, about the British regulator’s new policy on re-tendering, stating mistakenly that I “ask for ‘proof’ that lack of auditor rotation is a cause of fraud,” when I want no such impossible thing, but only recognition, as I have often said (see here) of the absence of “any evidence of a link between auditor tenure and audit quality.”

In the gathering gloom and darkness of late autumn, then:

Nothing good can be expected from the Securities and Exchange Commission in Washington, where Chairman Mary Schapiro is said to be packing for her post-election departure, having in her light-touch tenure realized nothing of effect on the structure or stability of the assurance function. 

On the globalization of accounting standards, the dialog is if anything more sterile than ever: The SEC has only an interim chief accountant in place; the griping about non-convergence includes the hand-wringing of IASB trustee chairman Michel Prada and the sideline irrelevancies of AICPA president Barry Melancon; while FASB chair Leslie Seidman should be plainly tired of the censorious Dutch-uncle utterances of her counterpart at the IASB, chairman and non-accountant Hans Hoogervorst.  

While on the auditing standards side, the intellectual heft brought by the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board to its project on Improving the Auditor’s Report is unmatched by the political skills or horse-power necessary for action in the face of entrenched resistance. At the same time, the PCAOB’s parallel Concept Release, going back to June 2011 – which by rights should be cooperative and complementary – wallows becalmed for lack of any readiness to re-engineer a reporting system in which all interested parties are invested in preserving the status quo.

Even what should be a bright spot – the launch earlier this month by seven joint sponsors of an assessment tool for audit committees, “Annual Evaluation of the External Auditor” – designed to support “an informed recommendation to the respective board of directors whether to retain the auditor,” has the taste of very thin gruel.

That is, it says precious little about the skill level of an audit committee, to think it requires such an anodyne checklist as these “get-to-‘yes’” examples: 

• “Was the cost of the audit reasonable and sufficient for the size, complexity and risks of the company?”

• “Was the audit engagement partner able to explain accounting and auditing issues in an understandable manner?”

Enough with the softball treatment. For a committee obliged to justify itself, why are there not such substantial questions as:

• “What qualifications and training does the audit committee itself have in the exercise of skepticism and the avoidance of bias?"

• “If forced to rotate or re-tender the audit, does the company have a realistic alternative choice?” 

• “What other or different forms of assurance, beyond the current standard audit report, would company management and its community of information users find useful and valuable?”

Historians of the evolution of knowledge teach that systems on the cusp of obsolescence – inherently resistant to the disruptions of fundamental change – evolve only when those contributing to the prevailing inertia are forced into confrontation. 

But that when they are, the realignments are highly disruptive, in ways unpredictable in advance.

Meaning that the groundhog’s looming shadow is long, dark and ominous.

 

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Sarbanes-Oxley, Ten Years After -- Are We Having Fun Yet?

It has not been difficult, through this summer of discontent and turmoil in the world’s financial markets, to ignore with enthusiasm the comprehensively vacuous observations of the tenth anniversary of the Sarbanes-Oxley law. 

Readers will recall my long-held skepticism about that knee-jerk post-Enron exercise, going back to my July 20, 2002 observation in the International Herald Tribune about the preliminary Senate vote, that “any legislation receiving the bipartisan margin of 97-0 is bound to be fundamentally defective.”

Nor has the decade horribilis given any reason to change.

Of the smug and fatuous self-congratulations of the bill’s eponymous sponsors (webcast on July 30, 2012), the less said the better. As the English essayist Charles Lamb wrote about a blame-worthy poetic effort:

“It would be an insult to my readers’ understandings to attempt anything like a criticism on this farrago of false thoughts and nonsense.”[1]

Rather, some unasked questions should be advanced.

Regarding the self-interested back-patting of those with careers to be served by the inflictions of Sarbox –- the PCAOB’s members and staff and the spokesmen for the accounting oligopoly dependent on its compliance revenue:

“Would the elves in Santa Claus’s toy shop be expected to vote against Christmas?”

As for those purporting to see some claim of benefit, yet propounding no solutions to the continued eruptions of financial chicanery (here, here and here), the challenge remains that the cyclical nature of market bubbles makes inevitable a post-scandal period of cleansing and temporary return to virtue – political dynamics notwithstanding.  

Put another way, the storm of both scandal and outrage after Enron and WorldCom was bound to clear, no matter what. So instead of the wrong question, whether post-Enron corporate behavior is now improved, under both the Sarbanes-Oxley law and the law of unintended consequences, the proper operative question should be:

“Would financial reporting and assurance not be better if Sarbanes-Oxley had not been passed at all?”

First, American law since 1934 has pronounced it illegal to make false statements in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. So – as confirmed by the absence of prosecutions under the redundant Sarbox requirements for executive certifications of financial results (summarized by Michael Rapaport and Francine McKenna) -- that exercise has from the outset never been more than optics and cosmetics.

Second, a decade of PCAOB intrusion into the relationships between auditors and clients has engulfed the corporate reporting process in cost, paperwork and degradation of the assurance function (here and here) – while, into the bargain, failing either to advance coordinated global-scale assurance regulation and oversight in most of the world’s major capital markets (here) or to prevent (among others) the wave of securities malfeasance of off-shore origin, notably from China.

Third, as to the law’s centerpiece obligations on internal controls reporting and assurance, it was always true, even pre-Sarbox, that most decently-controlled companies would do reasonably well on compliance, most of the time – while a parade of horribles since then has made it clear that, for reasons of scope limitation or plain enforcement dysfunction, the law has been ineffectual against the rare but all-too-frequent and truly consequential cases.

A brief post-Sarbox sampler illustrates that – as generally true of large-scale challenges to risk identification and management -- it is the “outlier” cases that really matter:

• The control failures that brought down Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers

• The “buco nero” at Parmalat and the ghost employees at Satyam

• The in-house looting by the chief financial officers of Koss in Milwaukee and the city of Dixon Illinois

• The undetected Ponzi schemes of Bernie Madoff and Alan Stanford, unremarked by gate-keepers, regulators and out-of-control client advisors and abettors alike 

• The valuation fantasies behind the window-dressing at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

• The incentives-driven perversions in the mortgage businesses models of Washington Mutual, Countrywide and New Century

• The derivatives and trading fiascos at UBS, JP Morgan Chase, MF Global and now Knight Capital

What then is the purpose of law-making? Sarbanes-Oxley has manifestly not ameliorated the flaws persistent in the nation’s corporate reporting and assurance structures -- then of what use or benefit has it been? 

And, if only the mis-leading politically-motivated placebo that it appears, what more should be expected both of our elected representatives and of those aspiring to hold them to account?

 

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[1] “On the Tragedies of Shakespeare,” 1811.

GAAP / IFRS Convergence -- Has the SEC Finally Shut It Down At Last?

With the news on July 10 that the SEC staff’s now-published report on International Financial Reporting Standards would not include a recommendation on whether, when or how the US should get on board, I observed that the whole benighted exercise of “convergence” between IFRS and US GAAP was now, finally and deservedly, dead and buried. 

A knowledgeable reporter pushed back, writing that, “it ain’t over till it’s over.”

Let’s take a look, because it’s hard to be any more “over” than this.

My own view on the desirability of accounting standards convergence fits nowhere on the spectrum of advocacy, from David Albrecht’s “buy American” to Tom Selling’s pleas for intellectual integrity to Yale professor Shyam Sunder’s support for competing systems – much less the profession’s own hand-clapping for the endless process of inching IFRS and US GAAP together.

Rather, without a dog in the fight, I’ve long been convinced that the complexities and judgments within any of the competing sets of standards present ample opportunity for issuers’ self-service and manipulation, beyond the capability and competence of regulators and gate-keepers to achieve transparency or comparability, thus rendering the convergence debate mainly a serious distraction and waste of time and energy.

As I’ve been saying for years (e.g., May 2008), the politicized nature of the process -- including the endless maneuvering and circular finger-pointing among the Financial Accounting Standards Board, the International Accounting Standards Board, and regulators in Washington, London and Brussels -- far outstrips either the case for convergence or the vision and competence of the players to achieve it, even if they wanted to, which they don’t. There is simply neither leadership nor authority to overcome the mutually antagonistic forces – as summarized here in March 2010.

Which only becomes more pronounced with the departure of the SEC’s chief accountant, James Kroeker. As I wrote in May 2010, Chairman Mary Schapiro has shown little energy for the issue – whether from disinterest or under an agenda of more pressing concerns.

As I put it in April 2011:

“Why no-one has called the question on this endless charade reflects the two-level fantasy in the dialog: the IASB and the FASB both pretend to believe in the desirability of fully-converged accounting standards, and the community of financial statement issuers and users pretend to believe them.”  

So why the persistence of this endless exercise – so stalemated that if Saul’s trip to Damascus had depended on an SEC-like “roadmap,” his conversion would never have happened and Christianity would have remained a minor Galilean sect? 

It’s because at bottom, the situation is not so distressed as to call forth real change.

Across great arcs of history, systems degrade toward collapse – Ptolemaic astronomy, the Weimar Republic, American health care. But they only reach the point of fundamental change on two conditions:

• First, the case for change is not only recognized by its advocates, but endorsed by (or more likely, forced upon) the entrenched interests of the status quo.

• And second, that an alternative paradigm is available – as evolution does not occur in a vacuum.[1]    

No less than the examples cited, there is deep and wide dissatisfaction with the current state of financial accounting, reporting and assurance. But it is also true that broad sectors remain committed, like the ancient stargazers, to structures as creaky and obsolete as geocentric models for planetary motion. Namely: 

• Financial statement issuers prefer accounting principles flexible enough to yield their preferred results.

• The first instinct of regulators is to protect and expand their limited turf.

• And the gate-keepers survive on a model unevolved since Victorian times.  

Commentators may continue to assert that there are real mileposts down a possible road to GAAP/IFRS convergence.

But from here, there is no other end: the road for this dead horse is a short haul to the knacker’s yard.

 

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[1] See, e.g., Thomas Kuhn’s far-reaching 1962 essay, “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions”.

Watch This Space -- The Academics are Coming

 August in Washington? You’ve got to be kidding. Not even the national politicians are dumb enough to hang around that malarial swamp. 

So what could be better?

Answer: three days in a monster convention center in suburban Maryland, at the annual meeting of the American Accounting Association. At least my own registration is now in and official.

Of my two gigs there, the heavy lifting will be a panel on August 6 on “Rationalism in Accounting.”

Okay, stop the snickering! Just because such cringe-inducing pronouncements as the joint mash-up of the IASB and the FASB on lease expensing make the title of the panel sound as oxymoronic as "Jamie Dimon on risk management” or "François Hollande on French political leadership.” Teaser: leading the roster of smart people among whom I will struggle to keep up is always thoughtful Shyam Sunder of Yale – recently readable on this topic here. So at least have the good manners to hold your derision until you’ve sat in on the session.

The second should be more relaxed, and worth sticking around until the last afternoon – Dave Albrecht of The Summa hosting on the fun and games of blogging about the interesting issues that convene this group of party animals. 

Hope to see many of you there. Until then, enjoy the summer.

 

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Dixon Illinois: Fifty Three Million Dollars Go Missing -- So Who Let the Horses Out?

 

    Trust – but verify.

            -- Ronald Reagan 

The revelation of a $ 53 million embezzlement by the treasurer and comptroller of the city of Dixon Illinois – home of the 40^th American president – once again brings this to the fore:

“Why are the accountants still so bewildered that there should be an ‘expectations gap’?”

According to her criminal indictment released on May 1, Rita Crundwell went undetected since 1990 in accumulating all the appurtenances of a life of rural luxury – not only the typical clothing and jewelry, but trucks and trailers, Liberty Coach motor home and Ford Thunderbird convertible -- all supporting her sideline prominence in the boots-and-bling world of quarterhorse breeders (here).

Extractions of that magnitude, from the coffers of a city with an annual budget of only $ 8 to $ 9 million, might have required her full-time devotion to shoveling the cash with both hands. But the self-efficient Ms. Crundwell did not scruple to observe four full weeks of paid vacation each year, and was evidently only caught out when she extended her absence to an additional twelve weeks.

Separation of employees’ duties? Back-up authority that someone else should glance at the city’s checkbook? Allowing her family members to pick up the city’s mail while she was on her holidays? Could the demands of minding the city’s affairs be so simple, naive and blasé, even in the exurban Midwest?

As for the expected queries (here and here) – what about the gatekeepers at the corral?

A large regional accounting firm is reported to have done compilation services for the city since 2006, having done audits in prior years.[1] But the distinction has so far not been explored.

Which, borrowing a metaphor from Ms. Crundwell’s expensive equestrian hobby, is to beat a sad and very dead horse. Because, as the professionals are in the process of learning to their sorrow, simple proximity and association are enough to attract whole worlds of grief.

The International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board – source of auditing standards on a global basis – on March 16 issued a new version of guidance on the performance of compilations:

"Since a compilation engagement is not an assurance engagement, a compilation engagement does not require the practitioner to verify the accuracy or completeness of the information provided by management for the compilation, or otherwise to gather evidence to express an audit opinion or a review conclusion on the preparation of the financial information."

The IAASB also speaks to the intended use of compiled financial statements, however, posing the question whether: 

"External parties other than the intended users of the compiled financial information are likely to associate the practitioner with the financial information, and there is a risk that the level of the practitioner’s involvement with the information may be misunderstood …"

What the IAASB does not offer – understandably, considering the many settings in which full-blown audits are not worth the cost or effort involved – is aide to either the profession or the user community on a necessary risk-based inquiry:

“Just because a service can be done, does it make any sense and should it be done?”

The accounting profession, mistakenly relying on disclosure of the limits on what a compilation report does or does not say, has traditionally looked on that work as low risk – which it mostly is. But consider the environment, and the typical level and quality of competence, governance and integrity in municipal government. What level of confidence should with safety be routinely reposed in those entrusted with management of a small city’s financial resources?

A typical compilation report – while offering no opinion – does recite that the accountant has performed with appropriate skill, ethics and the exercise of appropriate professional judgment. But that is all it takes to get burned.

I have tried to get across, both to my students in Risk Management and to my friends and clients in the profession, that for one caught holding an empty gasoline can, while standing next to a suspicious conflagration, it is not easy to avoid suspicion of arson. The explanation goes down hard, that the container was an innocent impulse purchase at the local hardware store.

As both an exercise for law and business students, and a message in the real world: there is no harm in not wearing a seatbelt, most of the time – or in not locking the barn door. Except for the rare time when it isn’t okay – and then it really matters. A long record of “being lucky” or a history of “getting by” counts for nothing when a bad event exposes the devastation wrought by casual habits.

How accountable the good townsfolk of Dixon will hold their city fathers for the quality of their stewardship – and whatever the exit cost may ultimately be, for a blinkered exercise in the assessment of risk and exposure to Crundwell’s plundering – it is once more made crystal clear that the accounting profession continues to market services that are under-comprehended and over-sold.

 

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[1] My requests to the firm’s media contact for an opportunity to converse have not been answered.